[PATCH 0/2] arm64: harden shadow call stack pointer handling

Ard Biesheuvel ardb at kernel.org
Mon Dec 5 12:03:39 PST 2022


A couple of tweaks to the arm64 entry code to avoid loading the shadow
call stack pointer in a way that could potentially be unsafe in the
context of ROP attacks.

Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen at google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>

Ard Biesheuvel (2):
  arm64: Always load shadow stack pointer directly from the task struct
  arm64: Stash shadow stack pointer in the task struct on interrupt

 arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h |  7 ++++---
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S    | 16 +++++++---------
 arch/arm64/kernel/head.S     |  2 +-
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

-- 
2.35.1




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