Patch "arm64: Fix panic() when Spectre-v2 causes Spectre-BHB to re-allocate KVM vectors" has been added to the 5.4-stable tree

[gregkh at linuxfoundation.org]

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    arm64: Fix panic() when Spectre-v2 causes Spectre-BHB to re-allocate KVM vectors

to the 5.4-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     arm64-fix-panic-when-spectre-v2-causes-spectre-bhb-to-re-allocate-kvm-vectors.patch
and it can be found in the queue-5.4 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable at vger.kernel.org> know about it.


>From foo at baz Sat Dec  3 02:31:10 PM CET 2022
From: James Morse <james.morse at arm.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 18:28:18 +0000
Subject: arm64: Fix panic() when Spectre-v2 causes Spectre-BHB to re-allocate KVM vectors
To: stable at vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel at lists.infradead.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas at arm.com>, James Morse <james.morse at arm.com>, Sami Lee <sami.lee at mediatek.com>
Message-ID: <20221130182819.739068-2-james.morse at arm.com>

From: James Morse <james.morse at arm.com>

Sami reports that linux panic()s when resuming from suspend to RAM. This
is because when CPUs are brought back online, they re-enable any
necessary mitigations.

The Spectre-v2 and Spectre-BHB mitigations interact as both need to
done by KVM when exiting a guest. Slots KVM can use as vectors are
allocated, and templates for the mitigation are patched into the vector.

This fails if a new slot needs to be allocated once the kernel has finished
booting as it is no-longer possible to modify KVM's vectors:
| root at adam:/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1# echo 1 > online
| Unable to handle kernel write to read-only memory at virtual add>
| Mem abort info:
|   ESR = 0x9600004e
|   Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
|   SET = 0, FnV = 0
|   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
| Data abort info:
|   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x0000004e
|   CM = 0, WnR = 1
| swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 000000000f07a71c
| [ffff800000b4b800] pgd=00000009ffff8803, pud=00000009ffff7803, p>
| Internal error: Oops: 9600004e [#1] PREEMPT SMP
| Modules linked in:
| Process swapper/1 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000063153c53)
| CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.19.252-dirty #14
| Hardware name: ARM LTD ARM Juno Development Platform/ARM Juno De>
| pstate: 000001c5 (nzcv dAIF -PAN -UAO)
| pc : __memcpy+0x48/0x180
| lr : __copy_hyp_vect_bpi+0x64/0x90

| Call trace:
|  __memcpy+0x48/0x180
|  kvm_setup_bhb_slot+0x204/0x2a8
|  spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation+0x1b8/0x1d0
|  __verify_local_cpu_caps+0x54/0xf0
|  check_local_cpu_capabilities+0xc4/0x184
|  secondary_start_kernel+0xb0/0x170
| Code: b8404423 b80044c3 36180064 f8408423 (f80084c3)
| ---[ end trace 859bcacb09555348 ]---
| Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task!
| SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
| Kernel Offset: disabled
| CPU features: 0x10,25806086
| Memory Limit: none
| ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle ]

This is only a problem on platforms where there is only one CPU that is
vulnerable to both Spectre-v2 and Spectre-BHB.

The Spectre-v2 mitigation identifies the slot it can re-use by the CPU's
'fn'. It unconditionally writes the slot number and 'template_start'
pointer. The Spectre-BHB mitigation identifies slots it can re-use by
the CPU's template_start pointer, which was previously clobbered by the
Spectre-v2 mitigation.

When there is only one CPU that is vulnerable to both issues, this causes
Spectre-v2 to try to allocate a new slot, which fails.

Change both mitigations to check whether they are changing the slot this
CPU uses before writing the percpu variables again.

This issue only exists in the stable backports for Spectre-BHB which have
to use totally different infrastructure to mainline.

Reported-by: Sami Lee <sami.lee at mediatek.com>
Fixes: 9013fd4bc958 ("arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels")
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse at arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c |   16 +++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -170,9 +170,12 @@ static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_h
 		__copy_hyp_vect_bpi(slot, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end);
 	}
 
-	__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot);
-	__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn);
-	__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.template_start, hyp_vecs_start);
+	if (fn != __this_cpu_read(bp_hardening_data.fn)) {
+		__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot);
+		__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn);
+		__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.template_start,
+				 hyp_vecs_start);
+	}
 	raw_spin_unlock(&bp_lock);
 }
 #else
@@ -1320,8 +1323,11 @@ static void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const cha
 		__copy_hyp_vect_bpi(slot, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end);
 	}
 
-	__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot);
-	__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.template_start, hyp_vecs_start);
+	if (hyp_vecs_start != __this_cpu_read(bp_hardening_data.template_start)) {
+		__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot);
+		__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.template_start,
+				 hyp_vecs_start);
+	}
 	raw_spin_unlock(&bp_lock);
 }
 #else


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from james.morse at arm.com are

queue-5.4/arm64-errata-fix-kvm-spectre-v2-mitigation-selection-for-cortex-a57-a72.patch
queue-5.4/arm64-fix-panic-when-spectre-v2-causes-spectre-bhb-to-re-allocate-kvm-vectors.patch