[PATCH v6 08/12] KVM: arm64: Add handlers for protected VM System Registers
Fuad Tabba
tabba at google.com
Tue Oct 5 09:43:58 PDT 2021
Hi Drew,
On Tue, Oct 5, 2021 at 9:53 AM Andrew Jones <drjones at redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Sep 22, 2021 at 01:47:00PM +0100, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> > Add system register handlers for protected VMs. These cover Sys64
> > registers (including feature id registers), and debug.
> >
> > No functional change intended as these are not hooked in yet to
> > the guest exit handlers introduced earlier. So when trapping is
> > triggered, the exit handlers let the host handle it, as before.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba at google.com>
> > ---
> > arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_fixed_config.h | 195 ++++++++
> > arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h | 5 +
> > arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 5 +
> > arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/sys_regs.h | 28 ++
> > arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile | 2 +-
> > arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c | 492 +++++++++++++++++++++
> > 6 files changed, 726 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_fixed_config.h
> > create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/sys_regs.h
> > create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_fixed_config.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_fixed_config.h
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..0ed06923f7e9
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_fixed_config.h
> > @@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
> > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
> > +/*
> > + * Copyright (C) 2021 Google LLC
> > + * Author: Fuad Tabba <tabba at google.com>
> > + */
> > +
> > +#ifndef __ARM64_KVM_FIXED_CONFIG_H__
> > +#define __ARM64_KVM_FIXED_CONFIG_H__
> > +
> > +#include <asm/sysreg.h>
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * This file contains definitions for features to be allowed or restricted for
> > + * guest virtual machines, depending on the mode KVM is running in and on the
> > + * type of guest that is running.
> > + *
> > + * The ALLOW masks represent a bitmask of feature fields that are allowed
> > + * without any restrictions as long as they are supported by the system.
> > + *
> > + * The RESTRICT_UNSIGNED masks, if present, represent unsigned fields for
> > + * features that are restricted to support at most the specified feature.
> > + *
> > + * If a feature field is not present in either, than it is not supported.
> > + *
> > + * The approach taken for protected VMs is to allow features that are:
> > + * - Needed by common Linux distributions (e.g., floating point)
> > + * - Trivial to support, e.g., supporting the feature does not introduce or
> > + * require tracking of additional state in KVM
> > + * - Cannot be trapped or prevent the guest from using anyway
> > + */
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Allow for protected VMs:
> > + * - Floating-point and Advanced SIMD
> > + * - Data Independent Timing
> > + */
> > +#define PVM_ID_AA64PFR0_ALLOW (\
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_FP) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_DIT) \
> > + )
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Restrict to the following *unsigned* features for protected VMs:
> > + * - AArch64 guests only (no support for AArch32 guests):
> > + * AArch32 adds complexity in trap handling, emulation, condition codes,
> > + * etc...
> > + * - RAS (v1)
> > + * Supported by KVM
> > + */
> > +#define PVM_ID_AA64PFR0_RESTRICT_UNSIGNED (\
> > + FIELD_PREP(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_EL0), ID_AA64PFR0_ELx_64BIT_ONLY) | \
> > + FIELD_PREP(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1), ID_AA64PFR0_ELx_64BIT_ONLY) | \
> > + FIELD_PREP(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_EL2), ID_AA64PFR0_ELx_64BIT_ONLY) | \
> > + FIELD_PREP(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_EL3), ID_AA64PFR0_ELx_64BIT_ONLY) | \
> > + FIELD_PREP(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_RAS), ID_AA64PFR0_RAS_V1) \
> > + )
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Allow for protected VMs:
> > + * - Branch Target Identification
> > + * - Speculative Store Bypassing
> > + */
> > +#define PVM_ID_AA64PFR1_ALLOW (\
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_BT) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS) \
> > + )
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Allow for protected VMs:
> > + * - Mixed-endian
> > + * - Distinction between Secure and Non-secure Memory
> > + * - Mixed-endian at EL0 only
> > + * - Non-context synchronizing exception entry and exit
> > + */
> > +#define PVM_ID_AA64MMFR0_ALLOW (\
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR0_BIGENDEL) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR0_SNSMEM) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR0_BIGENDEL0) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR0_EXS) \
> > + )
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Restrict to the following *unsigned* features for protected VMs:
> > + * - 40-bit IPA
> > + * - 16-bit ASID
> > + */
> > +#define PVM_ID_AA64MMFR0_RESTRICT_UNSIGNED (\
> > + FIELD_PREP(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR0_PARANGE), ID_AA64MMFR0_PARANGE_40) | \
> > + FIELD_PREP(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR0_ASID), ID_AA64MMFR0_ASID_16) \
> > + )
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Allow for protected VMs:
> > + * - Hardware translation table updates to Access flag and Dirty state
> > + * - Number of VMID bits from CPU
> > + * - Hierarchical Permission Disables
> > + * - Privileged Access Never
> > + * - SError interrupt exceptions from speculative reads
> > + * - Enhanced Translation Synchronization
> > + */
> > +#define PVM_ID_AA64MMFR1_ALLOW (\
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR1_HADBS) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR1_VMIDBITS) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR1_HPD) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR1_PAN) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR1_SPECSEI) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR1_ETS) \
> > + )
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Allow for protected VMs:
> > + * - Common not Private translations
> > + * - User Access Override
> > + * - IESB bit in the SCTLR_ELx registers
> > + * - Unaligned single-copy atomicity and atomic functions
> > + * - ESR_ELx.EC value on an exception by read access to feature ID space
> > + * - TTL field in address operations.
> > + * - Break-before-make sequences when changing translation block size
> > + * - E0PDx mechanism
> > + */
> > +#define PVM_ID_AA64MMFR2_ALLOW (\
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR2_CNP) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR2_UAO) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR2_IESB) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR2_AT) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR2_IDS) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR2_TTL) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR2_BBM) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR2_E0PD) \
> > + )
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * No support for Scalable Vectors for protected VMs:
> > + * Requires additional support from KVM, e.g., context-switching and
> > + * trapping at EL2
> > + */
> > +#define PVM_ID_AA64ZFR0_ALLOW (0ULL)
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * No support for debug, including breakpoints, and watchpoints for protected
> > + * VMs:
> > + * The Arm architecture mandates support for at least the Armv8 debug
> > + * architecture, which would include at least 2 hardware breakpoints and
> > + * watchpoints. Providing that support to protected guests adds
> > + * considerable state and complexity. Therefore, the reserved value of 0 is
> > + * used for debug-related fields.
> > + */
> > +#define PVM_ID_AA64DFR0_ALLOW (0ULL)
> > +#define PVM_ID_AA64DFR1_ALLOW (0ULL)
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * No support for implementation defined features.
> > + */
> > +#define PVM_ID_AA64AFR0_ALLOW (0ULL)
> > +#define PVM_ID_AA64AFR1_ALLOW (0ULL)
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * No restrictions on instructions implemented in AArch64.
> > + */
> > +#define PVM_ID_AA64ISAR0_ALLOW (\
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_AES) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_SHA1) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_SHA2) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_CRC32) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_ATOMICS) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_RDM) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_SHA3) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_SM3) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_SM4) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_DP) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_FHM) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_TS) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_TLB) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_RNDR) \
> > + )
> > +
> > +#define PVM_ID_AA64ISAR1_ALLOW (\
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_APA) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_API) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_JSCVT) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_FCMA) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_LRCPC) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_FRINTTS) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_SB) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_SPECRES) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_BF16) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_DGH) | \
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_I8MM) \
> > + )
> > +
> > +#endif /* __ARM64_KVM_FIXED_CONFIG_H__ */
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h
> > index 657d0c94cf82..5afd14ab15b9 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h
> > @@ -115,7 +115,12 @@ int __pkvm_init(phys_addr_t phys, unsigned long size, unsigned long nr_cpus,
> > void __noreturn __host_enter(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt);
> > #endif
> >
> > +extern u64 kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64pfr0_el1_sys_val);
> > +extern u64 kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64pfr1_el1_sys_val);
> > +extern u64 kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64isar0_el1_sys_val);
> > +extern u64 kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64isar1_el1_sys_val);
> > extern u64 kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64mmfr0_el1_sys_val);
> > extern u64 kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64mmfr1_el1_sys_val);
> > +extern u64 kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64mmfr2_el1_sys_val);
> >
> > #endif /* __ARM64_KVM_HYP_H__ */
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
> > index fe102cd2e518..6aa7b0c5bf21 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
> > @@ -1802,8 +1802,13 @@ static int kvm_hyp_init_protection(u32 hyp_va_bits)
> > void *addr = phys_to_virt(hyp_mem_base);
> > int ret;
> >
> > + kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64pfr0_el1_sys_val) = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1);
> > + kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64pfr1_el1_sys_val) = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1);
> > + kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64isar0_el1_sys_val) = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1);
> > + kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64isar1_el1_sys_val) = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1);
> > kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64mmfr0_el1_sys_val) = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1);
> > kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64mmfr1_el1_sys_val) = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1);
> > + kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64mmfr2_el1_sys_val) = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1);
> >
> > ret = create_hyp_mappings(addr, addr + hyp_mem_size, PAGE_HYP);
> > if (ret)
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/sys_regs.h b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/sys_regs.h
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..0865163d363c
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/sys_regs.h
> > @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
> > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
> > +/*
> > + * Copyright (C) 2021 Google LLC
> > + * Author: Fuad Tabba <tabba at google.com>
> > + */
> > +
> > +#ifndef __ARM64_KVM_NVHE_SYS_REGS_H__
> > +#define __ARM64_KVM_NVHE_SYS_REGS_H__
> > +
> > +#include <asm/kvm_host.h>
> > +
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64pfr0(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64pfr1(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64zfr0(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64dfr0(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64dfr1(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64afr0(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64afr1(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64isar0(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64isar1(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64mmfr0(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64mmfr1(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64mmfr2(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> > +
> > +bool kvm_handle_pvm_sysreg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code);
> > +void __inject_undef64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> > +
> > +#endif /* __ARM64_KVM_NVHE_SYS_REGS_H__ */
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile
> > index 8d741f71377f..0bbe37a18d5d 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile
> > @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ lib-objs := $(addprefix ../../../lib/, $(lib-objs))
> >
> > obj-y := timer-sr.o sysreg-sr.o debug-sr.o switch.o tlb.o hyp-init.o host.o \
> > hyp-main.o hyp-smp.o psci-relay.o early_alloc.o stub.o page_alloc.o \
> > - cache.o setup.o mm.o mem_protect.o
> > + cache.o setup.o mm.o mem_protect.o sys_regs.o
> > obj-y += ../vgic-v3-sr.o ../aarch32.o ../vgic-v2-cpuif-proxy.o ../entry.o \
> > ../fpsimd.o ../hyp-entry.o ../exception.o ../pgtable.o
> > obj-y += $(lib-objs)
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..ef8456c54b18
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,492 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> > +/*
> > + * Copyright (C) 2021 Google LLC
> > + * Author: Fuad Tabba <tabba at google.com>
> > + */
> > +
> > +#include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
> > +#include <asm/kvm_fixed_config.h>
> > +#include <asm/kvm_mmu.h>
> > +
> > +#include <hyp/adjust_pc.h>
> > +
> > +#include "../../sys_regs.h"
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Copies of the host's CPU features registers holding sanitized values at hyp.
> > + */
> > +u64 id_aa64pfr0_el1_sys_val;
> > +u64 id_aa64pfr1_el1_sys_val;
> > +u64 id_aa64isar0_el1_sys_val;
> > +u64 id_aa64isar1_el1_sys_val;
> > +u64 id_aa64mmfr2_el1_sys_val;
> > +
> > +static inline void inject_undef64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + u32 esr = (ESR_ELx_EC_UNKNOWN << ESR_ELx_EC_SHIFT);
> > +
> > + vcpu->arch.flags |= (KVM_ARM64_EXCEPT_AA64_EL1 |
> > + KVM_ARM64_EXCEPT_AA64_ELx_SYNC |
> > + KVM_ARM64_PENDING_EXCEPTION);
> > +
> > + __kvm_adjust_pc(vcpu);
> > +
> > + write_sysreg_el1(esr, SYS_ESR);
> > + write_sysreg_el1(read_sysreg_el2(SYS_ELR), SYS_ELR);
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Inject an unknown/undefined exception to an AArch64 guest while most of its
> > + * sysregs are live.
> > + */
> > +void __inject_undef64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + *vcpu_pc(vcpu) = read_sysreg_el2(SYS_ELR);
> > + *vcpu_cpsr(vcpu) = read_sysreg_el2(SYS_SPSR);
> > +
> > + inject_undef64(vcpu);
> > +
> > + write_sysreg_el2(*vcpu_pc(vcpu), SYS_ELR);
> > + write_sysreg_el2(*vcpu_cpsr(vcpu), SYS_SPSR);
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Accessor for undefined accesses.
> > + */
> > +static bool undef_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > + struct sys_reg_params *p,
> > + const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
> > +{
> > + __inject_undef64(vcpu);
> > + return false;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Returns the restricted features values of the feature register based on the
> > + * limitations in restrict_fields.
> > + * A feature id field value of 0b0000 does not impose any restrictions.
> > + * Note: Use only for unsigned feature field values.
> > + */
> > +static u64 get_restricted_features_unsigned(u64 sys_reg_val,
> > + u64 restrict_fields)
> > +{
> > + u64 value = 0UL;
> > + u64 mask = GENMASK_ULL(ARM64_FEATURE_FIELD_BITS - 1, 0);
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * According to the Arm Architecture Reference Manual, feature fields
> > + * use increasing values to indicate increases in functionality.
> > + * Iterate over the restricted feature fields and calculate the minimum
> > + * unsigned value between the one supported by the system, and what the
> > + * value is being restricted to.
> > + */
> > + while (sys_reg_val && restrict_fields) {
> > + value |= min(sys_reg_val & mask, restrict_fields & mask);
> > + sys_reg_val &= ~mask;
> > + restrict_fields &= ~mask;
> > + mask <<= ARM64_FEATURE_FIELD_BITS;
> > + }
> > +
> > + return value;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Functions that return the value of feature id registers for protected VMs
> > + * based on allowed features, system features, and KVM support.
> > + */
> > +
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64pfr0(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + const struct kvm *kvm = (const struct kvm *)kern_hyp_va(vcpu->kvm);
> > + u64 set_mask = 0;
> > + u64 allow_mask = PVM_ID_AA64PFR0_ALLOW;
> > +
> > + if (!vcpu_has_sve(vcpu))
> > + allow_mask &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_SVE);
> > +
> > + set_mask |= get_restricted_features_unsigned(id_aa64pfr0_el1_sys_val,
> > + PVM_ID_AA64PFR0_RESTRICT_UNSIGNED);
> > +
> > + /* Spectre and Meltdown mitigation in KVM */
> > + set_mask |= FIELD_PREP(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2),
> > + (u64)kvm->arch.pfr0_csv2);
> > + set_mask |= FIELD_PREP(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3),
> > + (u64)kvm->arch.pfr0_csv3);
> > +
> > + return (id_aa64pfr0_el1_sys_val & allow_mask) | set_mask;
> > +}
> > +
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64pfr1(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + const struct kvm *kvm = (const struct kvm *)kern_hyp_va(vcpu->kvm);
> > + u64 allow_mask = PVM_ID_AA64PFR1_ALLOW;
> > +
> > + if (!kvm_has_mte(kvm))
> > + allow_mask &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_MTE);
> > +
> > + return id_aa64pfr1_el1_sys_val & allow_mask;
> > +}
> > +
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64zfr0(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + /*
> > + * No support for Scalable Vectors, therefore, hyp has no sanitized
> > + * copy of the feature id register.
> > + */
> > + BUILD_BUG_ON(PVM_ID_AA64ZFR0_ALLOW != 0ULL);
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64dfr0(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + /*
> > + * No support for debug, including breakpoints, and watchpoints,
> > + * therefore, pKVM has no sanitized copy of the feature id register.
> > + */
> > + BUILD_BUG_ON(PVM_ID_AA64DFR0_ALLOW != 0ULL);
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64dfr1(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + /*
> > + * No support for debug, therefore, hyp has no sanitized copy of the
> > + * feature id register.
> > + */
> > + BUILD_BUG_ON(PVM_ID_AA64DFR1_ALLOW != 0ULL);
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64afr0(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + /*
> > + * No support for implementation defined features, therefore, hyp has no
> > + * sanitized copy of the feature id register.
> > + */
> > + BUILD_BUG_ON(PVM_ID_AA64AFR0_ALLOW != 0ULL);
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64afr1(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + /*
> > + * No support for implementation defined features, therefore, hyp has no
> > + * sanitized copy of the feature id register.
> > + */
> > + BUILD_BUG_ON(PVM_ID_AA64AFR1_ALLOW != 0ULL);
> > + return 0;
> > +}
>
> Reading the same function five times make me wonder if a generator macro
> wouldn't be better for these.
I think so too. I'll do that.
> > +
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64isar0(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + return id_aa64isar0_el1_sys_val & PVM_ID_AA64ISAR0_ALLOW;
> > +}
> > +
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64isar1(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + u64 allow_mask = PVM_ID_AA64ISAR1_ALLOW;
> > +
> > + if (!vcpu_has_ptrauth(vcpu))
> > + allow_mask &= ~(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_APA) |
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_API) |
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA) |
> > + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI));
> > +
> > + return id_aa64isar1_el1_sys_val & allow_mask;
> > +}
> > +
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64mmfr0(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + u64 set_mask;
> > +
> > + set_mask = get_restricted_features_unsigned(id_aa64mmfr0_el1_sys_val,
> > + PVM_ID_AA64MMFR0_RESTRICT_UNSIGNED);
> > +
> > + return (id_aa64mmfr0_el1_sys_val & PVM_ID_AA64MMFR0_ALLOW) | set_mask;
> > +}
> > +
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64mmfr1(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + return id_aa64mmfr1_el1_sys_val & PVM_ID_AA64MMFR1_ALLOW;
> > +}
> > +
> > +u64 get_pvm_id_aa64mmfr2(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + return id_aa64mmfr2_el1_sys_val & PVM_ID_AA64MMFR2_ALLOW;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/* Read a sanitized cpufeature ID register by its sys_reg_desc. */
> > +static u64 read_id_reg(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > + struct sys_reg_desc const *r)
> > +{
> > + u32 id = reg_to_encoding(r);
> > +
> > + switch (id) {
> > + case SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1:
> > + return get_pvm_id_aa64pfr0(vcpu);
> > + case SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1:
> > + return get_pvm_id_aa64pfr1(vcpu);
> > + case SYS_ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1:
> > + return get_pvm_id_aa64zfr0(vcpu);
> > + case SYS_ID_AA64DFR0_EL1:
> > + return get_pvm_id_aa64dfr0(vcpu);
> > + case SYS_ID_AA64DFR1_EL1:
> > + return get_pvm_id_aa64dfr1(vcpu);
> > + case SYS_ID_AA64AFR0_EL1:
> > + return get_pvm_id_aa64afr0(vcpu);
> > + case SYS_ID_AA64AFR1_EL1:
> > + return get_pvm_id_aa64afr1(vcpu);
> > + case SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1:
> > + return get_pvm_id_aa64isar0(vcpu);
> > + case SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1:
> > + return get_pvm_id_aa64isar1(vcpu);
> > + case SYS_ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1:
> > + return get_pvm_id_aa64mmfr0(vcpu);
> > + case SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1:
> > + return get_pvm_id_aa64mmfr1(vcpu);
> > + case SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1:
> > + return get_pvm_id_aa64mmfr2(vcpu);
> > + default:
> > + /*
> > + * Should never happen because all cases are covered in
> > + * pvm_sys_reg_descs[] below.
>
> I'd drop the 'below' word. It's not overly helpful and since code gets
> moved it can go out of date.
Will fix.
> > + */
> > + WARN_ON(1);
>
> The above cases could also be generated by a macro. And I wonder if we can
> come up with something that makes sure these separate lists stay
> consistent with macros and build bugs in order to better avoid these
> "should never happen" situations.
Which ties in to Marc's comment for this patch. I'll handle this.
> > + break;
> > + }
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Accessor for AArch32 feature id registers.
> > + *
> > + * The value of these registers is "unknown" according to the spec if AArch32
> > + * isn't supported.
> > + */
> > +static bool pvm_access_id_aarch32(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > + struct sys_reg_params *p,
> > + const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
> > +{
> > + if (p->is_write)
> > + return undef_access(vcpu, p, r);
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * No support for AArch32 guests, therefore, pKVM has no sanitized copy
> > + * of AArch32 feature id registers.
> > + */
> > + BUILD_BUG_ON(FIELD_GET(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1),
> > + PVM_ID_AA64PFR0_RESTRICT_UNSIGNED) > ID_AA64PFR0_ELx_64BIT_ONLY);
> > +
> > + /* Use 0 for architecturally "unknown" values. */
> > + p->regval = 0;
> > + return true;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Accessor for AArch64 feature id registers.
> > + *
> > + * If access is allowed, set the regval to the protected VM's view of the
> > + * register and return true.
> > + * Otherwise, inject an undefined exception and return false.
> > + */
> > +static bool pvm_access_id_aarch64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > + struct sys_reg_params *p,
> > + const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
> > +{
> > + if (p->is_write)
> > + return undef_access(vcpu, p, r);
> > +
> > + p->regval = read_id_reg(vcpu, r);
> > + return true;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/* Mark the specified system register as an AArch32 feature id register. */
> > +#define AARCH32(REG) { SYS_DESC(REG), .access = pvm_access_id_aarch32 }
> > +
> > +/* Mark the specified system register as an AArch64 feature id register. */
> > +#define AARCH64(REG) { SYS_DESC(REG), .access = pvm_access_id_aarch64 }
> > +
> > +/* Mark the specified system register as not being handled in hyp. */
> > +#define HOST_HANDLED(REG) { SYS_DESC(REG), .access = NULL }
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Architected system registers.
> > + * Important: Must be sorted ascending by Op0, Op1, CRn, CRm, Op2
> > + *
> > + * NOTE: Anything not explicitly listed here is *restricted by default*, i.e.,
> > + * it will lead to injecting an exception into the guest.
> > + */
> > +static const struct sys_reg_desc pvm_sys_reg_descs[] = {
> > + /* Cache maintenance by set/way operations are restricted. */
> > +
> > + /* Debug and Trace Registers are restricted. */
> > +
> > + /* AArch64 mappings of the AArch32 ID registers */
> > + /* CRm=1 */
> > + AARCH32(SYS_ID_PFR0_EL1),
> > + AARCH32(SYS_ID_PFR1_EL1),
> > + AARCH32(SYS_ID_DFR0_EL1),
> > + AARCH32(SYS_ID_AFR0_EL1),
> > + AARCH32(SYS_ID_MMFR0_EL1),
> > + AARCH32(SYS_ID_MMFR1_EL1),
> > + AARCH32(SYS_ID_MMFR2_EL1),
> > + AARCH32(SYS_ID_MMFR3_EL1),
> > +
> > + /* CRm=2 */
> > + AARCH32(SYS_ID_ISAR0_EL1),
> > + AARCH32(SYS_ID_ISAR1_EL1),
> > + AARCH32(SYS_ID_ISAR2_EL1),
> > + AARCH32(SYS_ID_ISAR3_EL1),
> > + AARCH32(SYS_ID_ISAR4_EL1),
> > + AARCH32(SYS_ID_ISAR5_EL1),
> > + AARCH32(SYS_ID_MMFR4_EL1),
> > + AARCH32(SYS_ID_ISAR6_EL1),
> > +
> > + /* CRm=3 */
> > + AARCH32(SYS_MVFR0_EL1),
> > + AARCH32(SYS_MVFR1_EL1),
> > + AARCH32(SYS_MVFR2_EL1),
> > + AARCH32(SYS_ID_PFR2_EL1),
> > + AARCH32(SYS_ID_DFR1_EL1),
> > + AARCH32(SYS_ID_MMFR5_EL1),
> > +
> > + /* AArch64 ID registers */
> > + /* CRm=4 */
> > + AARCH64(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1),
> > + AARCH64(SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1),
> > + AARCH64(SYS_ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1),
> > + AARCH64(SYS_ID_AA64DFR0_EL1),
> > + AARCH64(SYS_ID_AA64DFR1_EL1),
> > + AARCH64(SYS_ID_AA64AFR0_EL1),
> > + AARCH64(SYS_ID_AA64AFR1_EL1),
> > + AARCH64(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1),
> > + AARCH64(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1),
> > + AARCH64(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1),
> > + AARCH64(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1),
> > + AARCH64(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1),
> > +
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_SCTLR_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_ACTLR_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_CPACR_EL1),
> > +
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_RGSR_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_GCR_EL1),
> > +
> > + /* Scalable Vector Registers are restricted. */
> > +
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_TTBR0_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_TTBR1_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_TCR_EL1),
> > +
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_APIBKEYLO_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_APIBKEYHI_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_APDAKEYLO_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_APDAKEYHI_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_APDBKEYLO_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_APDBKEYHI_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_APGAKEYLO_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_APGAKEYHI_EL1),
> > +
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_AFSR0_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_AFSR1_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_ESR_EL1),
> > +
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_ERRIDR_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_ERRSELR_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_ERXFR_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_ERXCTLR_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_ERXSTATUS_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_ERXADDR_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_ERXMISC0_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_ERXMISC1_EL1),
> > +
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_TFSR_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_TFSRE0_EL1),
> > +
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_FAR_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_PAR_EL1),
> > +
> > + /* Performance Monitoring Registers are restricted. */
> > +
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_MAIR_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_AMAIR_EL1),
> > +
> > + /* Limited Ordering Regions Registers are restricted. */
> > +
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_VBAR_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_DISR_EL1),
> > +
> > + /* GIC CPU Interface registers are restricted. */
> > +
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_CONTEXTIDR_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_TPIDR_EL1),
> > +
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_SCXTNUM_EL1),
> > +
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_CNTKCTL_EL1),
> > +
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_CCSIDR_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_CLIDR_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_CSSELR_EL1),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_CTR_EL0),
> > +
> > + /* Performance Monitoring Registers are restricted. */
> > +
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_TPIDR_EL0),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_TPIDRRO_EL0),
> > +
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_SCXTNUM_EL0),
> > +
> > + /* Activity Monitoring Registers are restricted. */
> > +
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_CNTP_TVAL_EL0),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_CNTP_CTL_EL0),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_CNTP_CVAL_EL0),
> > +
> > + /* Performance Monitoring Registers are restricted. */
> > +
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_DACR32_EL2),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_IFSR32_EL2),
> > + HOST_HANDLED(SYS_FPEXC32_EL2),
> > +};
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Handler for protected VM MSR, MRS or System instruction execution.
> > + *
> > + * Returns true if the hypervisor has handled the exit, and control should go
> > + * back to the guest, or false if it hasn't, to be handled by the host.
> > + */
> > +bool kvm_handle_pvm_sysreg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
> > +{
> > + const struct sys_reg_desc *r;
> > + struct sys_reg_params params;
> > + unsigned long esr = kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu);
> > + int Rt = kvm_vcpu_sys_get_rt(vcpu);
> > +
> > + params = esr_sys64_to_params(esr);
> > + params.regval = vcpu_get_reg(vcpu, Rt);
> > +
> > + r = find_reg(¶ms, pvm_sys_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(pvm_sys_reg_descs));
> > +
> > + /* Undefined access (RESTRICTED). */
> > + if (r == NULL) {
> > + __inject_undef64(vcpu);
> > + return true;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* Handled by the host (HOST_HANDLED) */
> > + if (r->access == NULL)
> > + return false;
> > +
> > + /* Handled by hyp: skip instruction if instructed to do so. */
> > + if (r->access(vcpu, ¶ms, r))
> > + __kvm_skip_instr(vcpu);
> > +
> > + if (!params.is_write)
> > + vcpu_set_reg(vcpu, Rt, params.regval);
> > +
> > + return true;
> > +}
> > --
> > 2.33.0.464.g1972c5931b-goog
> >
>
> Other than the nits and suggestion to try and build in some register list
> consistency checks, this looks good to me. I don't know what pKVM
> should / should not expose, but I like the approach this takes, so,
> FWIW,
>
> Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones at redhat.com>
Thank you,
/fuad
> Thanks,
> drew
>
> --
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>
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