[PATCH 2/5] kasan: init memory in kasan_(un)poison for HW_TAGS
Marco Elver
elver at google.com
Mon Mar 8 11:26:11 GMT 2021
On Sat, Mar 06, 2021 at 01:15AM +0100, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
> This change adds an argument to kasan_poison() and kasan_unpoison()
> that allows initializing memory along with setting the tags for HW_TAGS.
>
> Combining setting allocation tags with memory initialization will
> improve HW_TAGS KASAN performance when init_on_alloc/free is enabled.
>
> This change doesn't integrate memory initialization with KASAN,
> this is done is subsequent patches in this series.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl at google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver at google.com>
> ---
> lib/test_kasan.c | 4 ++--
> mm/kasan/common.c | 28 ++++++++++++++--------------
> mm/kasan/generic.c | 12 ++++++------
> mm/kasan/kasan.h | 14 ++++++++------
> mm/kasan/shadow.c | 10 +++++-----
> mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 2 +-
> 6 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
> index e5647d147b35..d77c45edc7cd 100644
> --- a/lib/test_kasan.c
> +++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
> @@ -1044,14 +1044,14 @@ static void match_all_mem_tag(struct kunit *test)
> continue;
>
> /* Mark the first memory granule with the chosen memory tag. */
> - kasan_poison(ptr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE, (u8)tag);
> + kasan_poison(ptr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE, (u8)tag, false);
>
> /* This access must cause a KASAN report. */
> KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *ptr = 0);
> }
>
> /* Recover the memory tag and free. */
> - kasan_poison(ptr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE, get_tag(ptr));
> + kasan_poison(ptr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE, get_tag(ptr), false);
> kfree(ptr);
> }
>
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> index b5e08d4cefec..316f7f8cd8e6 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ void kasan_disable_current(void)
>
> void __kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size)
> {
> - kasan_unpoison(address, size);
> + kasan_unpoison(address, size, false);
> }
>
> #if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task)
> {
> void *base = task_stack_page(task);
>
> - kasan_unpoison(base, THREAD_SIZE);
> + kasan_unpoison(base, THREAD_SIZE, false);
> }
>
> /* Unpoison the stack for the current task beyond a watermark sp value. */
> @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
> */
> void *base = (void *)((unsigned long)watermark & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1));
>
> - kasan_unpoison(base, watermark - base);
> + kasan_unpoison(base, watermark - base, false);
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK */
>
> @@ -108,14 +108,14 @@ void __kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
> tag = kasan_random_tag();
> for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
> page_kasan_tag_set(page + i, tag);
> - kasan_unpoison(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order);
> + kasan_unpoison(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order, false);
> }
>
> void __kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
> {
> if (likely(!PageHighMem(page)))
> kasan_poison(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order,
> - KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
> + KASAN_FREE_PAGE, false);
> }
>
> /*
> @@ -251,18 +251,18 @@ void __kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page)
> for (i = 0; i < compound_nr(page); i++)
> page_kasan_tag_reset(page + i);
> kasan_poison(page_address(page), page_size(page),
> - KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
> + KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE, false);
> }
>
> void __kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
> {
> - kasan_unpoison(object, cache->object_size);
> + kasan_unpoison(object, cache->object_size, false);
> }
>
> void __kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
> {
> kasan_poison(object, round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
> - KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
> + KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE, false);
> }
>
> /*
> @@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static inline bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache,
> }
>
> kasan_poison(object, round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
> - KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
> + KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE, false);
>
> if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine))
> return false;
> @@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ void __kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
> if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) {
> if (____kasan_kfree_large(ptr, ip))
> return;
> - kasan_poison(ptr, page_size(page), KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
> + kasan_poison(ptr, page_size(page), KASAN_FREE_PAGE, false);
> } else {
> ____kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
> }
> @@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache,
> * Unpoison the whole object.
> * For kmalloc() allocations, kasan_kmalloc() will do precise poisoning.
> */
> - kasan_unpoison(tagged_object, cache->object_size);
> + kasan_unpoison(tagged_object, cache->object_size, false);
>
> /* Save alloc info (if possible) for non-kmalloc() allocations. */
> if (kasan_stack_collection_enabled())
> @@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ static inline void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache,
> redzone_end = round_up((unsigned long)(object + cache->object_size),
> KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> kasan_poison((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
> - KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
> + KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE, false);
>
> /*
> * Save alloc info (if possible) for kmalloc() allocations.
> @@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
> KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(virt_to_page(ptr));
> kasan_poison((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
> - KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE);
> + KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE, false);
>
> return (void *)ptr;
> }
> @@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag
> * Part of it might already have been unpoisoned, but it's unknown
> * how big that part is.
> */
> - kasan_unpoison(object, size);
> + kasan_unpoison(object, size, false);
>
> page = virt_to_head_page(object);
>
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
> index 2e55e0f82f39..53cbf28859b5 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/generic.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
> @@ -208,11 +208,11 @@ static void register_global(struct kasan_global *global)
> {
> size_t aligned_size = round_up(global->size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>
> - kasan_unpoison(global->beg, global->size);
> + kasan_unpoison(global->beg, global->size, false);
>
> kasan_poison(global->beg + aligned_size,
> global->size_with_redzone - aligned_size,
> - KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE);
> + KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE, false);
> }
>
> void __asan_register_globals(struct kasan_global *globals, size_t size)
> @@ -292,11 +292,11 @@ void __asan_alloca_poison(unsigned long addr, size_t size)
> WARN_ON(!IS_ALIGNED(addr, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE));
>
> kasan_unpoison((const void *)(addr + rounded_down_size),
> - size - rounded_down_size);
> + size - rounded_down_size, false);
> kasan_poison(left_redzone, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE,
> - KASAN_ALLOCA_LEFT);
> + KASAN_ALLOCA_LEFT, false);
> kasan_poison(right_redzone, padding_size + KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE,
> - KASAN_ALLOCA_RIGHT);
> + KASAN_ALLOCA_RIGHT, false);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_alloca_poison);
>
> @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ void __asan_allocas_unpoison(const void *stack_top, const void *stack_bottom)
> if (unlikely(!stack_top || stack_top > stack_bottom))
> return;
>
> - kasan_unpoison(stack_top, stack_bottom - stack_top);
> + kasan_unpoison(stack_top, stack_bottom - stack_top, false);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_allocas_unpoison);
>
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> index 7fbb32234414..823a90d6a0cd 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> @@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ static inline u8 kasan_random_tag(void) { return 0; }
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
>
> -static inline void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value)
> +static inline void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value, bool init)
> {
> addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr);
>
> @@ -344,10 +344,10 @@ static inline void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value)
> if (WARN_ON(size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK))
> return;
>
> - hw_set_mem_tag_range((void *)addr, size, value, false);
> + hw_set_mem_tag_range((void *)addr, size, value, init);
> }
>
> -static inline void kasan_unpoison(const void *addr, size_t size)
> +static inline void kasan_unpoison(const void *addr, size_t size, bool init)
> {
> u8 tag = get_tag(addr);
>
> @@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ static inline void kasan_unpoison(const void *addr, size_t size)
> return;
> size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>
> - hw_set_mem_tag_range((void *)addr, size, tag, false);
> + hw_set_mem_tag_range((void *)addr, size, tag, init);
> }
>
> static inline bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr)
> @@ -380,22 +380,24 @@ static inline bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr)
> * @addr - range start address, must be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE
> * @size - range size, must be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE
> * @value - value that's written to metadata for the range
> + * @init - whether to initialize the memory range (only for hardware tag-based)
> *
> * The size gets aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE before marking the range.
> */
> -void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value);
> +void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value, bool init);
>
> /**
> * kasan_unpoison - mark the memory range as accessible
> * @addr - range start address, must be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE
> * @size - range size, can be unaligned
> + * @init - whether to initialize the memory range (only for hardware tag-based)
> *
> * For the tag-based modes, the @size gets aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE before
> * marking the range.
> * For the generic mode, the last granule of the memory range gets partially
> * unpoisoned based on the @size.
> */
> -void kasan_unpoison(const void *addr, size_t size);
> +void kasan_unpoison(const void *addr, size_t size, bool init);
>
> bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr);
>
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/shadow.c b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> index 63f43443f5d7..727ad4629173 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
> return __memcpy(dest, src, len);
> }
>
> -void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value)
> +void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value, bool init)
> {
> void *shadow_start, *shadow_end;
>
> @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ void kasan_poison_last_granule(const void *addr, size_t size)
> }
> #endif
>
> -void kasan_unpoison(const void *addr, size_t size)
> +void kasan_unpoison(const void *addr, size_t size, bool init)
> {
> u8 tag = get_tag(addr);
>
> @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison(const void *addr, size_t size)
> return;
>
> /* Unpoison all granules that cover the object. */
> - kasan_poison(addr, round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), tag);
> + kasan_poison(addr, round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), tag, false);
>
> /* Partially poison the last granule for the generic mode. */
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
> @@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
> return;
>
> size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> - kasan_poison(start, size, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID);
> + kasan_poison(start, size, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID, false);
> }
>
> void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
> @@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
> if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(start))
> return;
>
> - kasan_unpoison(start, size);
> + kasan_unpoison(start, size, false);
> }
>
> static int kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr,
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c b/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c
> index 94c2d33be333..bd0c64d4e4d9 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c
> @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_storeN_noabort);
>
> void __hwasan_tag_memory(unsigned long addr, u8 tag, unsigned long size)
> {
> - kasan_poison((void *)addr, size, tag);
> + kasan_poison((void *)addr, size, tag, false);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_tag_memory);
>
> --
> 2.30.1.766.gb4fecdf3b7-goog
>
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