[PATCH 05/12] kasan: unify large kfree checks
Marco Elver
elver at google.com
Wed Feb 3 07:13:59 EST 2021
On Mon, Feb 01, 2021 at 08:43PM +0100, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
> Unify checks in kasan_kfree_large() and in kasan_slab_free_mempool()
> for large allocations as it's done for small kfree() allocations.
>
> With this change, kasan_slab_free_mempool() starts checking that the
> first byte of the memory that's being freed is accessible.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl at google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver at google.com>
> ---
> include/linux/kasan.h | 16 ++++++++--------
> mm/kasan/common.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
> 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
> index 2d5de4092185..d53ea3c047bc 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kasan.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
> @@ -200,6 +200,13 @@ static __always_inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
> return false;
> }
>
> +void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
> +static __always_inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr)
> +{
> + if (kasan_enabled())
> + __kasan_kfree_large(ptr, _RET_IP_);
> +}
> +
> void __kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
> static __always_inline void kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr)
> {
> @@ -247,13 +254,6 @@ static __always_inline void * __must_check kasan_krealloc(const void *object,
> return (void *)object;
> }
>
> -void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip);
> -static __always_inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr)
> -{
> - if (kasan_enabled())
> - __kasan_kfree_large(ptr, _RET_IP_);
> -}
> -
> /*
> * Unlike kasan_check_read/write(), kasan_check_byte() is performed even for
> * the hardware tag-based mode that doesn't rely on compiler instrumentation.
> @@ -302,6 +302,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
> {
> return false;
> }
> +static inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr) {}
> static inline void kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr) {}
> static inline void *kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
> gfp_t flags)
> @@ -322,7 +323,6 @@ static inline void *kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size,
> {
> return (void *)object;
> }
> -static inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr) {}
> static inline bool kasan_check_byte(const void *address)
> {
> return true;
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> index 086bb77292b6..9c64a00bbf9c 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> @@ -364,6 +364,31 @@ bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
> return ____kasan_slab_free(cache, object, ip, true);
> }
>
> +static bool ____kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
> +{
> + if (ptr != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr))) {
> + kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
> + return true;
> + }
> +
> + if (!kasan_byte_accessible(ptr)) {
> + kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
> + return true;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * The object will be poisoned by kasan_free_pages() or
> + * kasan_slab_free_mempool().
> + */
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
> +{
> + ____kasan_kfree_large(ptr, ip);
> +}
> +
> void __kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
> {
> struct page *page;
> @@ -377,10 +402,8 @@ void __kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
> * KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE, and kmalloc falls back onto page_alloc.
> */
> if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) {
> - if (ptr != page_address(page)) {
> - kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
> + if (____kasan_kfree_large(ptr, ip))
> return;
> - }
> kasan_poison(ptr, page_size(page), KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
> } else {
> ____kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
> @@ -539,13 +562,6 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag
> return ____kasan_kmalloc(page->slab_cache, object, size, flags);
> }
>
> -void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
> -{
> - if (ptr != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr)))
> - kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
> - /* The object will be poisoned by kasan_free_pages(). */
> -}
> -
> bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *address, unsigned long ip)
> {
> if (!kasan_byte_accessible(address)) {
> --
> 2.30.0.365.g02bc693789-goog
>
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