[PATCH v10 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall

Will Deacon will at kernel.org
Wed Apr 7 22:37:02 BST 2021


On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 04:23:44PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> This provides the ability for architectures to enable kernel stack base
> address offset randomization. This feature is controlled by the boot
> param "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off", with its default value set by
> CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT.
> 
> This feature is based on the original idea from the last public release
> of PaX's RANDKSTACK feature: https://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/randkstack.txt
> All the credit for the original idea goes to the PaX team. Note that
> the design and implementation of this upstream randomize_kstack_offset
> feature differs greatly from the RANDKSTACK feature (see below).

[...]

> diff --git a/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..fd80fab663a9
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
> +#ifndef _LINUX_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_H
> +#define _LINUX_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_H
> +
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/jump_label.h>
> +#include <linux/percpu-defs.h>
> +
> +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT,
> +			 randomize_kstack_offset);
> +DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset);
> +
> +/*
> + * Do not use this anywhere else in the kernel. This is used here because
> + * it provides an arch-agnostic way to grow the stack with correct
> + * alignment. Also, since this use is being explicitly masked to a max of
> + * 10 bits, stack-clash style attacks are unlikely. For more details see
> + * "VLAs" in Documentation/process/deprecated.rst
> + */
> +void *__builtin_alloca(size_t size);
> +/*
> + * Use, at most, 10 bits of entropy. We explicitly cap this to keep the
> + * "VLA" from being unbounded (see above). 10 bits leaves enough room for
> + * per-arch offset masks to reduce entropy (by removing higher bits, since
> + * high entropy may overly constrain usable stack space), and for
> + * compiler/arch-specific stack alignment to remove the lower bits.
> + */
> +#define KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(x)	((x) & 0x3FF)
> +
> +/*
> + * These macros must be used during syscall entry when interrupts and
> + * preempt are disabled, and after user registers have been stored to
> + * the stack.
> + */

This comment is out of date, as this is called from preemptible context on
arm64. Does that matter in terms of offset randomness?

Will



More information about the linux-arm-kernel mailing list