[PATCH stable v4.9 v2] arm64: entry: Place an SB sequence following an ERET instruction

Sasha Levin sashal at kernel.org
Fri Jul 10 20:28:01 EDT 2020


On Thu, Jul 09, 2020 at 12:50:23PM -0700, Florian Fainelli wrote:
>From: Will Deacon <will.deacon at arm.com>
>
>commit 679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8 upstream
>
>Some CPUs can speculate past an ERET instruction and potentially perform
>speculative accesses to memory before processing the exception return.
>Since the register state is often controlled by a lower privilege level
>at the point of an ERET, this could potentially be used as part of a
>side-channel attack.
>
>This patch emits an SB sequence after each ERET so that speculation is
>held up on exception return.
>
>Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon at arm.com>
>[florian: Adjust hyp-entry.S to account for the label
> added change to hyp/entry.S]
>Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli at gmail.com>

I've queued it up, thanks!

-- 
Thanks,
Sasha



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