[PATCH RESEND 3/6] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v1

Robert Richter robert.richter at cavium.com
Tue Sep 18 02:52:27 PDT 2018


On 18.09.18 09:38:05, Will Deacon wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 17, 2018 at 07:22:07PM +0200, Robert Richter wrote:
> > On 27.08.18 16:33:07, Mian Yousaf Kaukab wrote:
> > > Hard-coded since patches are merged and there are no configuration
> > > options.
> >
> > Could you add a list of upstream patches to the description that are
> > required to solve this? This would be a strict definition for the
> > mitigation being enabled and makes it easier to check if backports are
> > affected or not. A build-time check would be ideal (e.g. checking for
> > certain macros).
> 
> Hmm, I don't grok what you're proposing here. Why do we need a build-time
> check (and to check what?)

My concern is, that for kernel backports (esp. distro kernels) there
could be various interpretations of what "Mitigation: __user pointer
sanitization" means. So a list of upstream patches that need to be
backported in addition to this patch as a requirement would be good to
agree on. That should be documented in the patch description.

If these mitigations are available in a kernel backport, that could be
even checked at build time. E.g. we could have a sanity check if the
macro array_index_nospec() is defined. But such a check does not
replace a code review of a kernel backport.

I hope that makes sense?

-Robert



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