[PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack
Laura Abbott
labbott at redhat.com
Thu May 3 12:00:26 PDT 2018
On 05/03/2018 12:19 AM, Mark Rutland wrote:
> Hi Laura,
>
> On Wed, May 02, 2018 at 01:33:26PM -0700, Laura Abbott wrote:
>>
>> Implementation of stackleak based heavily on the x86 version
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott at redhat.com>
>> ---
>> Now written in C instead of a bunch of assembly.
>
> This looks neat!
>
> I have a few minor comments below.
>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
>> index bf825f38d206..0ceea613c65b 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
>> @@ -55,6 +55,9 @@ arm64-reloc-test-y := reloc_test_core.o reloc_test_syms.o
>> arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP) += crash_dump.o
>> arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE) += sdei.o
>>
>> +arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += erase.o
>> +KASAN_SANITIZE_erase.o := n
>
> I suspect we want to avoid the full set of instrumentation suspects here, e.g.
> GKOV, KASAN, UBSAN, and KCOV.
>
>> +
>> obj-y += $(arm64-obj-y) vdso/ probes/
>> obj-m += $(arm64-obj-m)
>> head-y := head.o
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>> index ec2ee720e33e..3144f1ebdc18 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>> @@ -401,6 +401,11 @@ tsk .req x28 // current thread_info
>>
>> .text
>>
>> + .macro ERASE_KSTACK
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>> + bl erase_kstack
>> +#endif
>> + .endm
>
> Nit: The rest of our asm macros are lower-case -- can we stick to that here?
>
>> /*
>> * Exception vectors.
>> */
>> @@ -906,6 +911,7 @@ ret_to_user:
>> cbnz x2, work_pending
>> finish_ret_to_user:
>> enable_step_tsk x1, x2
>> + ERASE_KSTACK
>> kernel_exit 0
>> ENDPROC(ret_to_user)
>
> I believe we also need this in ret_fast_syscall.
>
> [...]
>
Yeah I had this in previous versions but I managed to out think
myself. I'll add it in with a comment to avoid confusion.
>> +asmlinkage void erase_kstack(void)
>> +{
>> + unsigned long p = current->thread.lowest_stack;
>> + unsigned long boundary = p & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1);
>> + unsigned long poison = 0;
>> + const unsigned long check_depth = STACKLEAK_POISON_CHECK_DEPTH /
>> + sizeof(unsigned long);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Let's search for the poison value in the stack.
>> + * Start from the lowest_stack and go to the bottom.
>> + */
>> + while (p > boundary && poison <= check_depth) {
>> + if (*(unsigned long *)p == STACKLEAK_POISON)
>> + poison++;
>> + else
>> + poison = 0;
>> +
>> + p -= sizeof(unsigned long);
>> + }
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * One long int at the bottom of the thread stack is reserved and
>> + * should not be poisoned (see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK).
>> + */
>> + if (p == boundary)
>> + p += sizeof(unsigned long);
>
> I wonder if end_of_stack() should be taught about CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK,
> given that's supposed to return the last *usable* long on the stack, and we
> don't account for this elsewhere.
>
> If we did, then IIUC we could do:
>
> unsigned long boundary = (unsigned long)end_of_stack(current);
>
> ... at the start of the function, and not have to worry about this explicitly.
>
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
>> + current->thread.prev_lowest_stack = p;
>> +#endif
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * So let's write the poison value to the kernel stack.
>> + * Start from the address in p and move up till the new boundary.
>> + */
>> + boundary = current_stack_pointer;
>
> I worry a little that the compiler can move the SP during a function's
> lifetime, but maybe that's only the case when there are VLAs, or something like
> that?
>
I think that's true and a risk we take writing this in C. Here's
the disassembly on gcc-7.3.1:
ffff00000809d4d8 <erase_kstack>:
ffff00000809d4d8: a9bf7bfd stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
ffff00000809d4dc: d5384100 mrs x0, sp_el0
ffff00000809d4e0: 910003fd mov x29, sp
ffff00000809d4e4: f946e400 ldr x0, [x0, #3528]
ffff00000809d4e8: 9272c404 and x4, x0, #0xffffffffffffc000
ffff00000809d4ec: eb04001f cmp x0, x4
ffff00000809d4f0: 540002c9 b.ls ffff00000809d548 <erase_kstack+0x70> // b.plast
ffff00000809d4f4: d2800003 mov x3, #0x0 // #0
ffff00000809d4f8: 9297ddc5 mov x5, #0xffffffffffff4111 // #-48879
ffff00000809d4fc: 14000008 b ffff00000809d51c <erase_kstack+0x44>
ffff00000809d500: d1002000 sub x0, x0, #0x8
ffff00000809d504: 52800022 mov w2, #0x1 // #1
ffff00000809d508: eb00009f cmp x4, x0
ffff00000809d50c: d2800003 mov x3, #0x0 // #0
ffff00000809d510: 1a9f27e1 cset w1, cc // cc = lo, ul, last
ffff00000809d514: 6a01005f tst w2, w1
ffff00000809d518: 54000180 b.eq ffff00000809d548 <erase_kstack+0x70> // b.none
ffff00000809d51c: f9400001 ldr x1, [x0]
ffff00000809d520: eb05003f cmp x1, x5
ffff00000809d524: 54fffee1 b.ne ffff00000809d500 <erase_kstack+0x28> // b.any
ffff00000809d528: 91000463 add x3, x3, #0x1
ffff00000809d52c: d1002000 sub x0, x0, #0x8
ffff00000809d530: f100407f cmp x3, #0x10
ffff00000809d534: 1a9f87e2 cset w2, ls // ls = plast
ffff00000809d538: eb00009f cmp x4, x0
ffff00000809d53c: 1a9f27e1 cset w1, cc // cc = lo, ul, last
ffff00000809d540: 6a01005f tst w2, w1
ffff00000809d544: 54fffec1 b.ne ffff00000809d51c <erase_kstack+0x44> // b.any
ffff00000809d548: eb00009f cmp x4, x0
ffff00000809d54c: 91002001 add x1, x0, #0x8
ffff00000809d550: 9a800020 csel x0, x1, x0, eq // eq = none
ffff00000809d554: 910003e1 mov x1, sp
ffff00000809d558: d5384102 mrs x2, sp_el0
ffff00000809d55c: f906e840 str x0, [x2, #3536]
ffff00000809d560: cb000023 sub x3, x1, x0
ffff00000809d564: d287ffe2 mov x2, #0x3fff // #16383
ffff00000809d568: eb02007f cmp x3, x2
ffff00000809d56c: 540001a8 b.hi ffff00000809d5a0 <erase_kstack+0xc8> // b.pmore
ffff00000809d570: 9297ddc2 mov x2, #0xffffffffffff4111 // #-48879
ffff00000809d574: eb01001f cmp x0, x1
ffff00000809d578: 54000082 b.cs ffff00000809d588 <erase_kstack+0xb0> // b.hs, b.nlast
ffff00000809d57c: f8008402 str x2, [x0], #8
ffff00000809d580: eb00003f cmp x1, x0
ffff00000809d584: 54ffffc8 b.hi ffff00000809d57c <erase_kstack+0xa4> // b.pmore
ffff00000809d588: 910003e1 mov x1, sp
ffff00000809d58c: d5384100 mrs x0, sp_el0
ffff00000809d590: f906e401 str x1, [x0, #3528]
ffff00000809d594: a8c17bfd ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16
ffff00000809d598: d65f03c0 ret
ffff00000809d59c: d503201f nop
ffff00000809d5a0: d4210000 brk #0x800
ffff00000809d5a4: 00000000 .inst 0x00000000 ; undefined
It looks to be okay although admittedly that's subject to compiler
whims. It might be safer to save the stack pointer almost as soon as
we get into the function and use that?
>> +
>> + BUG_ON(boundary - p >= THREAD_SIZE);
>> +
>> + while (p < boundary) {
>> + *(unsigned long *)p = STACKLEAK_POISON;
>> + p += sizeof(unsigned long);
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* Reset the lowest_stack value for the next syscall */
>> + current->thread.lowest_stack = current_stack_pointer;
>> +}
>
> Once this function returns, its data is left on the stack. Is that not a problem?
>
> No strong feelings either way, but it might be worth mentioning in the commit
> message.
>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
>> index f08a2ed9db0d..156fa0a0da19 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
>> @@ -364,6 +364,9 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long stack_start,
>> p->thread.cpu_context.pc = (unsigned long)ret_from_fork;
>> p->thread.cpu_context.sp = (unsigned long)childregs;
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>> + p->thread.lowest_stack = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(p);
>
> Nit: end_of_stack(p) would be slightly better semantically, even though
> currently equivalent to task_stack_page(p).
>
> [...]
>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>> +void __used check_alloca(unsigned long size)
>> +{
>> + unsigned long sp, stack_left;
>> +
>> + sp = current_stack_pointer;
>> +
>> + stack_left = sp & (THREAD_SIZE - 1);
>> + BUG_ON(stack_left < 256 || size >= stack_left - 256);
>> +}
>
> Is this arbitrary, or is there something special about 256?
>
> Even if this is arbitrary, can we give it some mnemonic?
>
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(check_alloca);
>> +#endif
>> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
>> index a34e9290a699..25dd2a14560d 100644
>> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
>> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
>> @@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt
>> KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(cflags-y) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \
>> -D__NO_FORTIFY \
>> $(call cc-option,-ffreestanding) \
>> - $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector)
>> + $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector) \
>> + $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
>>
>> GCOV_PROFILE := n
>> KASAN_SANITIZE := n
>
> I believe we'll also need to do this for the KVM hyp code in arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/.
>
> Thanks,
> Mark.
>
Thanks,
Laura
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