[PATCH 08/39] arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit

Alex Shi alex.shi at linaro.org
Fri Mar 9 01:06:51 PST 2018


From: Will Deacon <will.deacon at arm.com>

commit c2f0ad4fc089 upstream.

A mispredicted conditional call to set_fs could result in the wrong
addr_limit being forwarded under speculation to a subsequent access_ok
check, potentially forming part of a spectre-v1 attack using uaccess
routines.

This patch prevents this forwarding from taking place, but putting heavy
barriers in set_fs after writing the addr_limit.

Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland at arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon at arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas at arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi at linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 75363d723262..fc11c50af558 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -62,6 +62,13 @@ extern int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs);
 static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
 {
 	current_thread_info()->addr_limit = fs;
+
+	/*
+	 * Prevent a mispredicted conditional call to set_fs from forwarding
+	 * the wrong address limit to access_ok under speculation.
+	 */
+	dsb(nsh);
+	isb();
 }
 
 #define segment_eq(a, b)	((a) == (b))
-- 
2.16.2.440.gc6284da




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