[PATCH v2 07/11] arm64: Add skeleton to harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks

[Li Kun]

On 2018/1/19 22:28, Will Deacon Wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 19, 2018 at 11:37:24AM +0800, Li Kun wrote:
>> 在 2018/1/17 18:07, Will Deacon 写道:
>>> On Wed, Jan 17, 2018 at 12:10:33PM +0800, Yisheng Xie wrote:
>>>> On 2018/1/5 21:12, Will Deacon wrote:
>>>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/context.c b/arch/arm64/mm/context.c
>>>>> index 5f7097d0cd12..d99b36555a16 100644
>>>>> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/context.c
>>>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/context.c
>>>>> @@ -246,6 +246,8 @@ asmlinkage void post_ttbr_update_workaround(void)
>>>>>   			"ic iallu; dsb nsh; isb",
>>>>>   			ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456,
>>>>>   			CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_27456));
>>>>> +
>>>>> +	arm64_apply_bp_hardening();
>>>>>   }
>>>> post_ttbr_update_workaround was used for fix Cavium erratum 2745? so does that
>>>> means, if we do not have this erratum, we do not need arm64_apply_bp_hardening()?
>>>> when mm_swtich and kernel_exit?
>>>>
>>>>  From the code logical, it seems not only related to erratum 2745 anymore?
>>>> should it be renamed?
>>> post_ttbr_update_workaround just runs code after a TTBR update, which
>>> includes mitigations against variant 2 of "spectre" and also a workaround
>>> for a Cavium erratum. These are separate issues.
>> But AFAIU, according to the theory of spectre, we don't need to clear the
>> BTB every time we return to user?
>> If we enable CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN, there will be a call to
>> arm64_apply_bp_hardening every time kernel exit to el0.
>> kernel_exit
>>      post_ttbr_update_workaround
>>          arm64_apply_bp_hardening
> That's a really good point, thanks. What it means is that
> post_ttbr_update_workaround is actually the wrong place for this, and we
> should be doing it more directly on the switch_mm path -- probably in
> check_and_switch_context.
Yes, that's exactly what i mean.:-)
>
> Will

-- 
Best Regards
Li Kun