[PATCH 2/2] arm64: Branch predictor hardening for Cavium ThunderX2

[Jayachandran C]

On Mon, Jan 08, 2018 at 04:46:52PM +0000, Will Deacon wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 07, 2018 at 10:53:36PM -0800, Jayachandran C wrote:
> > Use PSCI based mitigation for speculative execution attacks targeting
> > the branch predictor. The approach is similar to the one used for
> > Cortex-A CPUs, but in case of ThunderX2 we add another SMC call to
> > test if the firmware supports the capability.
> > 
> > If the secure firmware has been updated with the mitigation code to
> > invalidate the branch target buffer, we use the PSCI version call to
> > invoke it.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Jayachandran C <jnair at caviumnetworks.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  1 file changed, 38 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> > index cb0fb37..abceb5d 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> > @@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ static void  install_bp_hardening_cb(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
> >  	__install_bp_hardening_cb(fn, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end);
> >  }
> >  
> > +#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
> >  #include <linux/psci.h>
> >  
> >  static int enable_psci_bp_hardening(void *data)
> > @@ -138,6 +139,33 @@ static int enable_psci_bp_hardening(void *data)
> >  
> >  	return 0;
> >  }
> > +
> > +#define CAVIUM_TX2_SIP_SMC_CALL		0xC200FF00
> > +#define CAVIUM_TX2_BTB_HARDEN_CAP	0xB0A0
> > +
> > +static int enable_tx2_psci_bp_hardening(void *data)
> > +{
> > +	const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry = data;
> > +	struct arm_smccc_res res;
> > +
> > +	if (!entry->matches(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU))
> > +		return;
> > +
> > +	arm_smccc_smc(CAVIUM_TX2_SIP_SMC_CALL, CAVIUM_TX2_BTB_HARDEN_CAP, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &res);
> 
> One thing to be aware of here is that if somebody configures qemu to emulate
> a TX2, this may actually disappear into EL3 and not return. You're better
> off sticking with PSCI GET_VERSION in terms of portability, but it's your
> call -- I'd expect you to deal with any breakage reports on the list due
> to the SMC above. Fair?

I don't like having a custom SMC here either. But Overloading PSCI get version
is the problem as I wrote earlier - there is no way to check if the firmware
implements BTB hardening with overloading. There is a good chance that users
with old firmware will just fail without any warning.

Is there a reason for overloading PSCI get version? Allocating a new standard
SMC number would make checking for existance and usage much simpler.

I did not quite understand the possible issue in qemu, unimplemented SMC calls
are expected to return an error code. What am I missing here?

> 
> > +	if (res.a0 != 0) {
> > +		pr_warn("Error: CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR enabled, but firmware does not support it\n");
> > +		return 0;
> > +	}
> 
> Please don't print this here; see below.
> 
> > +	if (res.a1 == 1 && psci_ops.get_version) {
> > +		pr_info("CPU%d: Branch predictor hardening enabled\n", smp_processor_id());
> 
> If you want to print a message, please put it in the capability structure
> .desc field.

Thanks, will fix this in the next rev.

JC.