[PATCH 27/52] arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for suspicious interrupts from EL0
Alex Shi
alex.shi at linaro.org
Mon Feb 26 00:20:01 PST 2018
From: Will Deacon <will.deacon at arm.com>
commit 30d88c0e3ace upstream.
It is possible to take an IRQ from EL0 following a branch to a kernel
address in such a way that the IRQ is prioritised over the instruction
abort. Whilst an attacker would need to get the stars to align here,
it might be sufficient with enough calibration so perform BP hardening
in the rare case that we see a kernel address in the ELR when handling
an IRQ from EL0.
Reported-by: Dan Hettena <dhettena at nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier at arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon at arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas at arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi at linaro.org>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 5 +++++
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 6 ++++++
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
index d50c2fe..e26a114 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -646,6 +646,11 @@ el0_irq_naked:
#endif
ct_user_exit
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+ tbz x22, #55, 1f
+ bl do_el0_irq_bp_hardening
+1:
+#endif
irq_handler
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
index 6120a14..ad49ae8 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -590,6 +590,12 @@ asmlinkage void __exception do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
arm64_notify_die("", regs, &info, esr);
}
+asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_irq_bp_hardening(void)
+{
+ /* PC has already been checked in entry.S */
+ arm64_apply_bp_hardening();
+}
+
asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_ia_bp_hardening(unsigned long addr,
unsigned int esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
--
2.7.4
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