[PATCH 02/37] iommu/sva: Bind process address spaces to devices
jean-philippe.brucker at arm.com
Thu Feb 15 04:40:57 PST 2018
On 13/02/18 23:34, Tian, Kevin wrote:
>> From: Jean-Philippe Brucker
>> Sent: Tuesday, February 13, 2018 8:57 PM
>> On 13/02/18 07:54, Tian, Kevin wrote:
>>>> From: Jean-Philippe Brucker
>>>> Sent: Tuesday, February 13, 2018 2:33 AM
>>>> Add bind() and unbind() operations to the IOMMU API. Device drivers
>>>> use them to share process page tables with their devices. bind_group()
>>>> is provided for VFIO's convenience, as it needs to provide a coherent
>>>> interface on containers. Other device drivers will most likely want to
>>>> use bind_device(), which binds a single device in the group.
>>> I saw your bind_group implementation tries to bind the address space
>>> for all devices within a group, which IMO has some problem. Based on
>>> spec, packet routing on the bus doesn't take PASID into consideration.
>>> since devices within same group cannot be isolated based on requestor-
>>> i.e. traffic not guaranteed going to IOMMU, enabling SVA on multiple
>>> could cause undesired p2p.
>> But so does enabling "classic" DMA... If two devices are not protected by
>> ACS for example, they are put in the same IOMMU group, and one device
>> might be able to snoop the other's DMA. VFIO allows userspace to create a
>> container for them and use MAP/UNMAP, but makes it explicit to the user
>> that for DMA, these devices are not isolated and must be considered as a
>> single device (you can't pass them to different VMs or put them in
>> different containers). So I tried to keep the same idea as MAP/UNMAP for
>> SVA, performing BIND/UNBIND operations on the VFIO container instead of
>> the device.
> there is a small difference. for classic DMA we can reserve PCI BARs
> when allocating IOVA, thus multiple devices in the same group can
> still work correctly applied with same translation, if isolation is not
> cared in between. However for SVA it's CPU virtual addresses
> managed by kernel mm thus difficult to introduce similar address
> reservation. Then it's possible for a VA falling into other device's
> BAR in the same group and cause undesired p2p traffic. In such
> regard, SVA is actually functionally-broken.
I think the problem exists even if there is a single device in the group.
If for example, malloc() returns a VA that corresponds to a PCI host
bridge in IOVA space, performing DMA on that buffer won't reach the IOMMU
and will cause undesirable side-effects.
My series doesn't address the problem, but I believe we should carve
reserved regions out of the process address space during bind(), for
example by creating a PROT_NONE vma preventing userspace from obtaining
If you solve this problem, you also solve it for multiple devices in a
group, because the IOMMU core provides the resv API on groups... That's
until you hotplug a device into a live group (currently WARN in VFIO),
with different resv regions.
>> I kept the analogy simple though, because I don't think there will be many
>> SVA-capable systems that require IOMMU groups. They will likely
> I agree that multiple SVA-capable devices in same IOMMU group is not
> a typical configuration, especially it's usually observed on new devices.
> Then based on above limitation, I think we could just explicitly avoid
> enabling SVA in such case. :-)
I'd certainly like that :)
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