[PATCH 0/9] Mitigations against spectre-v1 in the arm64 Linux kernel

[Catalin Marinas]

On Mon, Feb 05, 2018 at 03:34:15PM +0000, Will Deacon wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> This series implements some mitigations against spectre-v1 for arm64. It
> broadly follows the work that has been done for x86, by implementing:
> 
>   * A back-end version of array_index_mask_nospec() to suppress any
>     compiler optimisations that could introduce unwanted speculative
>     paths
> 
>   * Masking of the syscall number to restrict speculation through the
>     syscall table
> 
>   * Masking of __user pointers prior to deference in uaccess routines
> 
> The latter introduces complications in access_ok and set_fs which are
> also handled in this series.

Queued for 4.16. Thanks.

-- 
Catalin