[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode

[Al Viro]

On Fri, May 12, 2017 at 02:17:19PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:

> Two things are at risk from stack exhaustion: thread_info (mainly
> addr_limit) when on the stack (fixed by THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK), and

Really?  Let's take a look at arm, for example:

struct thread_info {
        unsigned long           flags;          /* low level flags */
        int                     preempt_count;  /* 0 => preemptable, <0 => bug */
        mm_segment_t            addr_limit;     /* address limit */
        struct task_struct      *task;          /* main task structure */

and current() is defined as current_thread_info()->task.

Seriously, look at these beasts.  Overwriting ->addr_limit is nowhere near
the top threat.  If attacker can overwrite thread_info, you have lost.