[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode

[Ingo Molnar]

* Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org> wrote:

> > There's the option of using GCC plugins now that the infrastructure was 
> > upstreamed from grsecurity. It can be used as part of the regular build 
> > process and as long as the analysis is pretty simple it shouldn't hurt compile 
> > time much.
> 
> Well, and that the situation may arise due to memory corruption, not from 
> poorly-matched set_fs() calls, which static analysis won't help solve. We need 
> to catch this bad kernel state because it is a very bad state to run in.

If memory corruption corrupted the task state into having addr_limit set to 
KERNEL_DS then there's already a fair chance that it's game over: it could also 
have set *uid to 0, or changed a sensitive PF_ flag, or a number of other 
things...

Furthermore, think about it: there's literally an infinite amount of corrupted 
task states that could be a security problem and that could be checked after every 
system call. Do we want to check every one of them?

Thanks,

	Ingo