[PATCH] lkdtm: add bad USER_DS test
borntraeger at de.ibm.com
Fri Mar 24 08:24:28 PDT 2017
On 03/24/2017 04:17 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 24, 2017 at 1:14 AM, Heiko Carstens
> <heiko.carstens at de.ibm.com> wrote:
>> On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 01:34:19PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> This adds CORRUPT_USER_DS to check that the get_fs() test on syscall return
>>> still sees USER_DS during the new VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE checks.
>>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>
>>> +void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void)
>>> + /*
>>> + * Test that USER_DS has been set correctly on exiting a syscall.
>>> + * Since setting this higher than USER_DS (TASK_SIZE) would introduce
>>> + * an exploitable condition, we lower it instead, since that should
>>> + * not create as large a problem on an unprotected system.
>>> + */
>>> + mm_segment_t lowfs;
>>> +#ifdef MAKE_MM_SEG
>>> + lowfs = MAKE_MM_SEG(TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE);
>>> + lowfs = TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE;
>>> + pr_info("setting bad task size limit\n");
>>> + set_fs(lowfs);
>> This won't work on architectures where the set_fs() argument does not
>> contain an address but an address space identifier. This is true e.g. for
>> s390 and as far as I know also for sparc.
>> On s390 we have complete distinct address spaces for kernel and user space
>> that each start at address zero.
> The patch that enforce USER_DS is disabled on s390 anyway. I guess, we
> can just do a set_fs(KERNEL_DS) for the others.
that would enable the test, but it would also mean that lkdtm can be used by
a program to escalate its rights. I think that is the reason why Kees did this
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