[PATCH v8 6/9] drivers: perf: hisi: Add support for Hisilicon Djtag driver
Mark Rutland
mark.rutland at arm.com
Fri Jun 9 08:44:25 PDT 2017
On Fri, Jun 09, 2017 at 03:18:39PM +0100, John Garry wrote:
> On 08/06/2017 17:35, Mark Rutland wrote:
> >On Mon, May 22, 2017 at 08:48:32PM +0800, Shaokun Zhang wrote:
> >>+/*
> >>+ * hisi_djtag_lock_v2: djtag lock to avoid djtag access conflict b/w kernel
> >>+ * and UEFI.
> >
> >The mention of UEFI here worries me somewhat, and I have a number of
> >questions specifically relating to how we interact with UEFI here.
>
> Hi Mark,
>
> This djtag locking mechanism is an advisory software-only policy.
> The problem is the hardware designers made an interface which does
> not consider multiple agents in the system concurrently accessing
> the djtag registers.
>
> System wide, djtag is used as an interface to other HW modules, but
> we only use for perf HW in the kernel.
>
> >When precisely does UEFI need to touch the djtag hardware? e.g. does
> >this happen in runtime services? ... or completely asynchronously?
>
> Actually it's trusted firmware which accesses for L3 cache
> management in CPU hotplug
Ok.
What happens if the lock is already held by an agent in that case?
Does the FW block until the lock is released?
Can you elaborate on CPU hotplug? Which CPU is performing the
maintenance in this scenario, and when? Can this block other CPUs until
the lock is released?
What happens if another agent pokes the djtag (without acquiring the
lock) while FW is doing this? Can this result in issues on the secure
side?
[...]
> >Can you explain how the locking scheme works? e.g. is this an
> >advisory software-only policy, or does the hardware prohibit accesses
> >from other agents somehow?
>
> The locking scheme is a software solution to spinlock. It's uses
> djtag module select register as the spinlock flag, to avoid using
> some shared memory.
>
> The tricky part is that there is no test-and-set hardware support,
> so we use this algorithm:
> - precondition: flag initially set unlocked
>
> a. agent reads flag
> - if not unlocked, continues to poll
> - otherwise, writes agent's unique lock value to flag
> b. agent waits defined amount of time *uninterrupted* and then
> checks the flag
> - if it is unchanged, it has the lock -> continue
> - if it is changed, it means other agent is trying to access the
> lock and got it, so it goes back to a.
> c. has lock, so safe to access djtag
> d. to unlock, release by writing "unlock" value to flag
This does not sound safe to me. There's always the potential for a race,
no matter how long an agent waits.
> >What happens if the kernel takes the lock, but doesn't release it?
>
> This should not happen. We use spinlock_irqsave() when locking.
> However I have noted that we can BUG if djtag access timeout, so we
> need to release the lock at this point. I don't think the code
> handles this properly now.
I was worried aobut BUG() and friends, and also preempt kernels.
It doesn't sound like it's possible to make this robust.
> >What happens if UEFI takes the lock, but doesn't release it?
>
> Again, we would not expect this to happen; but, if it does, Kernel
> access should timeout.
... which they do not, in this patch series, as far as I can tell.
This doesn't sound safe at all. :/
Thanks,
Mark.
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