[PATCH v14 3/5] tee: add OP-TEE driver
Jens Wiklander
jens.wiklander at linaro.org
Thu Jan 19 06:56:23 PST 2017
On Wed, Jan 18, 2017 at 05:28:17PM +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> On Wednesday, January 18, 2017 1:58:14 PM CET Jens Wiklander wrote:
> > Adds a OP-TEE driver which also can be compiled as a loadable module.
> >
> > * Targets ARM and ARM64
> > * Supports using reserved memory from OP-TEE as shared memory
> > * Probes OP-TEE version using SMCs
> > * Accepts requests on privileged and unprivileged device
> > * Uses OPTEE message protocol version 2 to communicate with secure world
>
> I had not really followed the last versions, and I've looked through
> it now for things that seemed odd to me, either because I don't understand
> them or because they could be improved. I'll try to read it again after
> I've seen clarifications on these points.
>
> Generally speaking I haven't seen any show-stoppers so far.
>
> > +struct optee_call_waiter {
> > + struct list_head list_node;
> > + struct completion c;
> > + bool completed;
> > +};
>
> It seems wrong to have both a 'struct completion' and 'bool completed' here,
> as completion already contains such a flag and is designed to update that
> atomically.
You're right, I'll remove the 'bool completed'.
>
> > +static void optee_cq_complete_one(struct optee_call_queue *cq)
> > +{
> > + struct optee_call_waiter *w;
> > +
> > + list_for_each_entry(w, &cq->waiters, list_node) {
> > + if (!w->completed) {
> > + complete(&w->c);
> > + w->completed = true;
> > + break;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void optee_cq_wait_final(struct optee_call_queue *cq,
> > + struct optee_call_waiter *w)
> > +{
> > + mutex_lock(&cq->mutex);
> > +
> > + /* Get out of the list */
> > + list_del(&w->list_node);
> > +
> > + optee_cq_complete_one(cq);
> > + /*
> > + * If we're completed we've got a completion that some other task
> > + * could have used instead.
> > + */
> > + if (w->completed)
> > + optee_cq_complete_one(cq);
> > +
> > + mutex_unlock(&cq->mutex);
> > +}
>
> This deserves some more comments: the function name suggests that you are
> waiting for a specific optee_call_waiter, but then it calls
> optee_cq_complete_one(), which unconditionally completes the first
> incomplete completion and it never waits.
OK, I'm updating these functions with more comments. The purpose of
these functions is to deal with resource shortage in secure world.
There's a limit on how many threads that execute concurrently in secure
world. optee_cq_wait_for_completion() waits for any task returning from
a call to secure world, optee_cq_complete_one() doesn't care who's
completed as long as tasks aren't stuck when there's available resources
in secure world.
>
> > +static struct tee_shm_pool *
> > +optee_config_shm_ioremap(struct device *dev, optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn,
> > + void __iomem **ioremaped_shm)
> > +{
> > + union {
> > + struct arm_smccc_res smccc;
> > + struct optee_smc_get_shm_config_result result;
> > + } res;
> > + struct tee_shm_pool *pool;
> > + unsigned long vaddr;
> > + phys_addr_t paddr;
> > + size_t size;
> > + phys_addr_t begin;
> > + phys_addr_t end;
> > + void __iomem *va;
> > + struct tee_shm_pool_mem_info priv_info;
> > + struct tee_shm_pool_mem_info dmabuf_info;
> > +
> > + invoke_fn(OPTEE_SMC_GET_SHM_CONFIG, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &res.smccc);
> > + if (res.result.status != OPTEE_SMC_RETURN_OK) {
> > + dev_info(dev, "shm service not available\n");
> > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (res.result.settings != OPTEE_SMC_SHM_CACHED) {
> > + dev_err(dev, "only normal cached shared memory supported\n");
> > + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> > + }
> > +
> > + begin = roundup(res.result.start, PAGE_SIZE);
> > + end = rounddown(res.result.start + res.result.size, PAGE_SIZE);
> > + paddr = begin;
> > + size = end - begin;
> > +
> > + if (size < 2 * OPTEE_SHM_NUM_PRIV_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE) {
> > + dev_err(dev, "too small shared memory area\n");
> > + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> > + }
> > +
> > + va = ioremap_cache(paddr, size);
> > + if (!va) {
> > + dev_err(dev, "shared memory ioremap failed\n");
> > + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> > + }
> > + vaddr = (unsigned long)va;
>
> I think you should call memremap() instead of ioremap_cache() here and assume
> that you are talking to actual RAM.
Thanks, I'll update.
>
> > +static int __init optee_driver_init(void)
> > +{
> > + struct device_node *node;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Preferred path is /firmware/optee, but it's the matching that
> > + * matters.
> > + */
> > + for_each_matching_node(node, optee_match)
> > + of_platform_device_create(node, NULL, NULL);
> > +
> > + return platform_driver_register(&optee_driver);
> > +}
> > +module_init(optee_driver_init);
> > +
> > +static void __exit optee_driver_exit(void)
> > +{
> > + platform_driver_unregister(&optee_driver);
> > +}
> > +module_exit(optee_driver_exit);
>
> What is the platform driver good for if the same module has to create the
> platform devices itself?
The platform device(s) are created here because the optee node is below
"/firmware" instead of the root where it would have had the platform
device created automatically.
I think it's useful to be able to unload the module, the early reviews
of this patch set was much focused around that. Regardless I'll need
some device as parent for the devices created during optee_probe() and
using a platform device for that seems natural.
I'd rather keep the platform driver. Perhaps some variant of the pattern
in qcom_scm_init() (drivers/firmware/qcom_scm.c) is useful, except that
I need to find out what to do about the life cycle of the objects
created with of_platform_populate().
>
> I'd just skip it and do
>
> for_each_matching_node(node, optee_match)
> optee_probe(node);
>
> I also suspect that module unloading is broken here if you don't clean
> up the platform devices in the end, so you should already remove the
> exit function to prevent unloading.
Does the platform devices really need cleaning? I mean
of_platform_default_populate_init() creates a bunch of platform devices
which are just left there even if unused. Here we're doing the same
thing except that we're doing it for a specific node in the DT.
>
> > +struct optee_msg_arg {
> > + u32 cmd;
> > + u32 func;
> > + u32 session;
> > + u32 cancel_id;
> > + u32 pad;
> > + u32 ret;
> > + u32 ret_origin;
> > + u32 num_params;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * this struct is 8 byte aligned since the 'struct optee_msg_param'
> > + * which follows requires 8 byte alignment.
> > + *
> > + * Commented out element used to visualize the layout dynamic part
> > + * of the struct. This field is not available at all if
> > + * num_params == 0.
> > + *
> > + * params is accessed through the macro OPTEE_MSG_GET_PARAMS
> > + *
> > + * struct optee_msg_param params[num_params];
> > + */
> > +} __aligned(8);
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * OPTEE_MSG_GET_PARAMS - return pointer to struct optee_msg_param *
> > + *
> > + * @x: Pointer to a struct optee_msg_arg
> > + *
> > + * Returns a pointer to the params[] inside a struct optee_msg_arg.
> > + */
> > +#define OPTEE_MSG_GET_PARAMS(x) \
> > + (struct optee_msg_param *)(((struct optee_msg_arg *)(x)) + 1)
>
> If you make the last member of optee_msg_arg
>
> struct optee_msg_param params[0];
>
> then you can remove both the macro here and the alignment attribute.
OK.
>
> > +/*****************************************************************************
> > + * Part 2 - requests from normal world
> > + *****************************************************************************/
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Return the following UID if using API specified in this file without
> > + * further extensions:
> > + * 384fb3e0-e7f8-11e3-af63-0002a5d5c51b.
> > + * Represented in 4 32-bit words in OPTEE_MSG_UID_0, OPTEE_MSG_UID_1,
> > + * OPTEE_MSG_UID_2, OPTEE_MSG_UID_3.
> > + */
> > +#define OPTEE_MSG_UID_0 0x384fb3e0
> > +#define OPTEE_MSG_UID_1 0xe7f811e3
> > +#define OPTEE_MSG_UID_2 0xaf630002
> > +#define OPTEE_MSG_UID_3 0xa5d5c51b
> > +#define OPTEE_MSG_FUNCID_CALLS_UID 0xFF01
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Returns 2.0 if using API specified in this file without further
> > + * extensions. Represented in 2 32-bit words in OPTEE_MSG_REVISION_MAJOR
> > + * and OPTEE_MSG_REVISION_MINOR
> > + */
> > +#define OPTEE_MSG_REVISION_MAJOR 2
> > +#define OPTEE_MSG_REVISION_MINOR 0
> > +#define OPTEE_MSG_FUNCID_CALLS_REVISION 0xFF03
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Get UUID of Trusted OS.
> > + *
> > + * Used by non-secure world to figure out which Trusted OS is installed.
> > + * Note that returned UUID is the UUID of the Trusted OS, not of the API.
> > + *
> > + * Returns UUID in 4 32-bit words in the same way as
> > + * OPTEE_MSG_FUNCID_CALLS_UID described above.
> > + */
> > +#define OPTEE_MSG_OS_OPTEE_UUID_0 0x486178e0
> > +#define OPTEE_MSG_OS_OPTEE_UUID_1 0xe7f811e3
> > +#define OPTEE_MSG_OS_OPTEE_UUID_2 0xbc5e0002
> > +#define OPTEE_MSG_OS_OPTEE_UUID_3 0xa5d5c51b
> > +#define OPTEE_MSG_FUNCID_GET_OS_UUID 0x0000
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Get revision of Trusted OS.
> > + *
> > + * Used by non-secure world to figure out which version of the Trusted OS
> > + * is installed. Note that the returned revision is the revision of the
> > + * Trusted OS, not of the API.
> > + *
> > + * Returns revision in 2 32-bit words in the same way as
> > + * OPTEE_MSG_CALLS_REVISION described above.
> > + */
> > +#define OPTEE_MSG_OS_OPTEE_REVISION_MAJOR 1
> > +#define OPTEE_MSG_OS_OPTEE_REVISION_MINOR 0
> > +#define OPTEE_MSG_FUNCID_GET_OS_REVISION 0x0001
>
> Just for my understanding, what is the significance of these numbers,
> i.e. which code (user space, kernel driver, trusted OS) provides
> the uuid and which one provides the version? The code comments almost
> make sense to me, but I don't see why specific versions are listed
> in this header.
You're right, OPTEE_MSG_OS_OPTEE_REVISION_* should be removed. The
actual version the secure OS is of a mostly informational nature. The
same goes the OS UUID, but I suppose the actual UUID used by the
upstream version of OP-TEE OS could be interesting to know.
>
> What is the expected behavior when one side reports a version that
> is unknown? Can one side claim to be backwards compatible with
> a previous version, or does each new version need support on
> all three sides?
The UUID and version of the message protocol are important to match
correctly as otherwise it could mean that there's something unexpected
in secure world that following the message protocol would be undefined
behaviour. All changes to the message protocol should be backwards
compatible in the sense that the driver and secure world need to
negotiate eventual extensions while probing. That's what we're doing in
optee_msg_exchange_capabilities().
>
> > diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c b/drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..0b9c1a2accd0
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c
> > +static void handle_rpc_func_cmd_wq(struct optee *optee,
> > + struct optee_msg_arg *arg)
> > +{
> > + struct optee_msg_param *params;
> > +
> > + if (arg->num_params != 1)
> > + goto bad;
> > +
> > + params = OPTEE_MSG_GET_PARAMS(arg);
> > + if ((params->attr & OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_TYPE_MASK) !=
> > + OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_TYPE_VALUE_INPUT)
> > + goto bad;
> > +
> > + switch (params->u.value.a) {
> > + case OPTEE_MSG_RPC_WAIT_QUEUE_SLEEP:
> > + wq_sleep(&optee->wait_queue, params->u.value.b);
> > + break;
> > + case OPTEE_MSG_RPC_WAIT_QUEUE_WAKEUP:
> > + wq_wakeup(&optee->wait_queue, params->u.value.b);
> > + break;
> > + default:
> > + goto bad;
> > + }
> > +
> > + arg->ret = TEEC_SUCCESS;
> > + return;
> > +bad:
> > + arg->ret = TEEC_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
> > +}
> > +
>
> I'm trying to understand what this is good for. What I can see is that
> you have a user space process calling into the kernel asking the tee
> to do some command, and then the tee can ask the kernel to wait for
> something to happen, or notify it that something has happened.
>
> If we wait here, the user process gets suspended until this has
> actually happened.
>
> Am I reading this correctly? If yes, what is the intended use case?
> Is there some process that is meant to always wait here? What
> if we ever need to wait for more than one thing at a time (think
> select or poll?)
I'm updating the comments for OPTEE_MSG_RPC_CMD_WAIT_QUEUE with:
"If secure world need to wait for a secure world mutex it issues a sleep
request instead of spinning in secure world. Conversely is a wakeup
request issued when a secure world mutex with a thread waiting thread is
unlocked."
The way we're waking up a sleeping thread is a bit limiting in some
circumstances.
One case is where we need to do it from a secure interrupt handler.
Because there's no way of doing this kind of RPC to normal world from a
secure interrupt handler. In that case it wouldn't be mutex the thread
is waiting for though.
Another case is where there's several guest running in the system and
more than one guests has access to secure world. If guest2 waits for
mutex which guest1 is releasing, how can guest2 be notified? Normal RPC
is impossible here also.
The only way around this limitation I've come up with so far is by doing
the wakeup via a software generated interrupt destined to the correct
guest. However this problem is beyond the scope of this patch set.
>
> > + params = OPTEE_MSG_GET_PARAMS(arg);
> > + if ((params->attr & OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_TYPE_MASK) !=
> > + OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_TYPE_VALUE_INPUT)
> > + goto bad;
> > +
> > + msec_to_wait = params->u.value.a;
> > +
> > + /* set task's state to interruptible sleep */
> > + set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
> > +
> > + /* take a nap */
> > + schedule_timeout(msecs_to_jiffies(msec_to_wait));
>
> This can be done simpler with msleep();
OK.
Thanks,
Jens
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