[RFC PATCH] arm64: Make arch_randomize_brk avoid stack area

[Kees Cook]

On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 4:13 AM, Jon Medhurst (Tixy) <tixy at linaro.org> wrote:
> On Mon, 2016-05-02 at 12:34 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Thu, Apr 28, 2016 at 7:17 AM, Jon Medhurst (Tixy) <tixy at linaro.org> wrote:
> [...]
>
>> >  arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------
>> >  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>> >
>> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
>> > index 07c4c53..7e0f404 100644
>> > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
>> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
>> > @@ -434,13 +434,25 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
>> >         return sp & ~0xf;
>> >  }
>> >
>> > -static unsigned long randomize_base(unsigned long base)
>> > +unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
>> >  {
>> > +       unsigned long base = mm->brk;
>> >         unsigned long range_end = base + (STACK_RND_MASK << PAGE_SHIFT) + 1;
>>
>> This looks wrong. Shouldn't it be (STACK_RND_MASK + 1) << PAGE_SHIFT ?
>
> That value is the same as before my changes and it matches the gap left
> for stack randomisation in arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c

True, I didn't mean it was part of your patch. It just jumped out at
me as something that didn't look right that should probably get fixed
too.

>> STACK_RND_MASK is 0x7ff (32-bit) or 0x3ffff (64-bit):
>>
>> #define STACK_RND_MASK                  (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? \
>>                                                 0x7ff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12) : \
>>                                                 0x3ffff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
>>
>> (4K paged PAGE_SHIFT is 12)
>>
>> So the correct offset max would be 0x800000 (32-bit) and 0x40000000
>> (64-bit), instead of
>> 0x7ff0001 and 0x3ffff0001.
>
> It seems to me there isn't a 'correct' and 'incorrect' range to use here
> and that randomising brk is not directly related to stack randomisation,
> they just have similar requirements and constraints.

Well, I think it's a typo. The code seemed to be wanting to convert a
mask to a range, but when adding PAGE_SHIFT, it went in the wrong
place.

> Anyway, for stack randomisation, in fs/binfmt_elf.c,
> randomize_stack_top() has
>
>                 random_variable = get_random_long();
>                 random_variable &= STACK_RND_MASK;
>                 random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
>
> so stack top can be randomised by adding a number from zero to
> (STACK_RND_MASK << PAGE_SHIFT) inclusive. As the end value passed to
> randomize_range() is exclusive, then adding one to the last permissible

Well, no, this is using the mask correctly. It removes keeps the bits
it's interested in and then promotes them above the page size.

> value seems the like the right, I.e. arm64's usage of
>
>   (STACK_RND_MASK << PAGE_SHIFT) + 1
>
> for brk is 'correct' in that it's consistent with what happens to the
> stack. Though the different functions align values to pages at different
> stages, so possibly neither that nor
>
>   (STACK_RND_MASK + 1)  << PAGE_SHIFT
>
> when used for brk, would be the same as the stack code.

Anyway, this can be a separate fix. Your changes should make sense in
either place (well, it should be a no-op for current kernel, but
that's fine).

>> Even with that correction, this looks wrong for 32-bit, which uses
>> 0x2000000 natively:
>>
>> unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
>> {
>>         unsigned long range_end = mm->brk + 0x02000000;
>>         return randomize_range(mm->brk, range_end, 0) ? : mm->brk;
>> }
>>
>> Seems like arm64 compat is using 4 times less entropy than native arm?
>> (Note that STACK_RND_MASK is correct for arm64 compat: this matches
>> the default in fs/binfmt_elf.c that arm uses. It just seems like the
>> brk randomization is accidentally too small on arm64 compat since arm
>> uses a fixed value unrelated to stack randomization.)
>>
>> 0x02000000 arm native
>> 0x00800000 arm64 compat  <- bug?
>> 0x40000000 arm64
>
> Well, it's a difference for which there probably isn't a good reason,
> don't know if people would call it a bug.

It's a behavioral change between native and compat which reduces the
entropy of brk randomization, so I'm comfortable to call it a bug. :)

> As changing the range of values used for randomisation seems like a
> separate issue I won't include any changes for that in my patch for
> getting brk to avoid the stack.

Sounds fine. Can you resend your change as a v2 with the changelog, etc?

Thanks!

-Kees

>
> --
> Tixy
>



-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security