[PATCH] arm: Use kernel mm when updating section permissions
Kees Cook
keescook at chromium.org
Fri Nov 6 11:08:06 PST 2015
On Fri, Nov 6, 2015 at 10:44 AM, Laura Abbott <labbott at redhat.com> wrote:
> On 11/05/2015 05:15 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 5, 2015 at 5:05 PM, Laura Abbott <labbott at redhat.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> On 11/05/2015 08:27 AM, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Nov 05, 2015 at 08:20:42AM -0800, Laura Abbott wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 11/05/2015 01:46 AM, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Nov 04, 2015 at 05:00:39PM -0800, Laura Abbott wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Currently, read only permissions are not being applied even
>>>>>>> when CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA is set. This is because section_update
>>>>>>> uses current->mm for adjusting the page tables. current->mm
>>>>>>> need not be equivalent to the kernel version. Use pgd_offset_k
>>>>>>> to get the proper page directory for updating.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What are you trying to achieve here? You can't use these functions
>>>>>> at run time (after the first thread has been spawned) to change
>>>>>> permissions, because there will be multiple copies of the kernel
>>>>>> section mappings, and those copies will not get updated.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In any case, this change will probably break kexec and ftrace, as
>>>>>> the running thread will no longer see the updated page tables.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I think I was hitting that exact problem with multiple copies
>>>>> not getting updated. The section_update code was being called
>>>>> and I was seeing the tables get updated but nothing was being
>>>>> applied when I tried to write to text or check the debugfs
>>>>> page table. The current flow is:
>>>>>
>>>>> rest_init -> kernel_thread(kernel_init) and from that thread
>>>>> mark_rodata_ro. So mark_rodata_ro is always going to happen
>>>>> in a thread.
>>>>>
>>>>> Do we need to update for both init_mm and the first running
>>>>> thread?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The "first running thread" is merely coincidental for things like kexec.
>>>>
>>>> Hmm. Actually, I think the existing code _should_ be fine. At the
>>>> point where mark_rodata_ro() is, we should still be using init_mm, so
>>>> updating the current threads page tables should actually be updating
>>>> the swapper_pg_dir.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That doesn't seem to hold true. Based on what I'm seeing, we lose
>>> the the guarantee of init_mm after the first exec. If usermodehelper
>>> gets called to load a module, that triggers an exec and the kernel
>>> thread is no longer using init_mm after that. I'm testing with the
>>> multi-v7 defconfig which uses the smsc911x driver which loads a
>>> module during initcall. That gets called before mark_rodata_ro so
>>> the init_mm is never updated. I verified that disabling smsc911x
>>> makes things work as expected. I suspect the testing was never done
>>> with a driver that tried to call usermodehelper during init time.
>>
>>
>> Ooooh. Nice catch. Yeah, my testing didn't include that case.
>>
>>> I got as far as narrowing it down that it happens after the
>>> usermodehelper
>>> but I wasn't able to pinpoint where exactly the switch happened. It seems
>>> like we need to have the page tables set up before any initcalls
>>> happen otherwise we risk having an exec create stray processes which we
>>> can't update.
>>
>>
>> Can we just make mark_rodata_ro() a no-op and do the RO setting
>> earlier when we do the NX setting?
>>
>
> Unfortunately no. The time we are doing the nx setting is before we've
> finished
> with the initmem so we need the initmem to be finished and freed before we
> can
> mark anything RO.
>
> More importantly, the NX settings are also not getting set. Compare before:
>
> ---[ Kernel Mapping ]---
> 0xc0000000-0xc0300000 3M RW NX
> 0xc0300000-0xc1300000 16M RW x
> 0xc1300000-0xcc000000 173M RW NX
> 0xcc000000-0xcc040000 256K RW NX MEM/BUFFERABLE/WC
> 0xcc040000-0xcc100000 768K RW NX MEM/CACHED/WBRA
> 0xcc100000-0xcc280000 1536K RW NX MEM/BUFFERABLE/WC
> 0xcc280000-0xd0000000 62976K RW NX MEM/CACHED/WBRA
> 0xd0000000-0xd0200000 2M RW NX
>
> and after
>
> ---[ Kernel Mapping ]---
> 0xc0000000-0xc0300000 3M RW NX
> 0xc0300000-0xc0c00000 9M ro x
> 0xc0c00000-0xc1100000 5M ro NX
> 0xc1100000-0xcc000000 175M RW NX
> 0xcc000000-0xcc040000 256K RW NX MEM/BUFFERABLE/WC
> 0xcc040000-0xcc100000 768K RW NX MEM/CACHED/WBRA
> 0xcc100000-0xcc280000 1536K RW NX MEM/BUFFERABLE/WC
> 0xcc280000-0xd0000000 62976K RW NX MEM/CACHED/WBRA
> 0xd0000000-0xd0200000 2M RW NX
>
>
> with my test patch. I think setting both current->active_mm and &init_mm
> is sufficient. Maybe explicitly setting swapper_pg_dir would be cleaner?
>
> Is there a test that should be running in a CI somewhere to catch cases like
> this where the permissions are not working as expected
I wrote these for lkdtm -- actually just mentioned it here:
http://lwn.net/Articles/663531/
EXEC_DATA
EXEC_STACK
EXEC_KMALLOC
EXEC_VMALLOC
EXEC_USERSPACE
ACCESS_USERSPACE
WRITE_RO
WRITE_KERN
Each of those should Oops the kernel if things are working correctly.
I'm not aware of a public CI that currently handles checking for
expected Oops via lkdtm.
The other tests I ran when building this were to turn ftrace on and
off. If that works for you, then this patch seems fine. (AIUI, the
code would be unchanged from original when running ftrace, so I would
expect this to work.)
-Kees
>
> My test patch that seems to be working:
>
> ----8<-----
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/init.c b/arch/arm/mm/init.c
> index 8a63b4c..6276b234 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/mm/init.c
> +++ b/arch/arm/mm/init.c
> @@ -627,12 +627,10 @@ static struct section_perm ro_perms[] = {
> * safe to be called with preemption disabled, as under stop_machine().
> */
> static inline void section_update(unsigned long addr, pmdval_t mask,
> - pmdval_t prot)
> + pmdval_t prot, struct mm_struct *mm)
> {
> - struct mm_struct *mm;
> pmd_t *pmd;
> - mm = current->active_mm;
> pmd = pmd_offset(pud_offset(pgd_offset(mm, addr), addr), addr);
> #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_LPAE
> @@ -656,7 +654,7 @@ static inline bool arch_has_strict_perms(void)
> return !!(get_cr() & CR_XP);
> }
> -#define set_section_perms(perms, field) {
> \
> +#define set_section_perms(perms, field, all) { \
> size_t i; \
> unsigned long addr; \
> \
> @@ -674,31 +672,35 @@ static inline bool arch_has_strict_perms(void)
> \
> for (addr = perms[i].start; \
> addr < perms[i].end; \
> - addr += SECTION_SIZE) \
> + addr += SECTION_SIZE) { \
> section_update(addr, perms[i].mask, \
> - perms[i].field); \
> + perms[i].field, current->active_mm);
> \
> + if (all) \
> + section_update(addr, perms[i].mask, \
> + perms[i].field, &init_mm); \
> + } \
> } \
> }
> -static inline void fix_kernmem_perms(void)
> +void fix_kernmem_perms(void)
> {
> - set_section_perms(nx_perms, prot);
> + set_section_perms(nx_perms, prot, true);
> }
> #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
> void mark_rodata_ro(void)
> {
> - set_section_perms(ro_perms, prot);
> + set_section_perms(ro_perms, prot, true);
> }
> void set_kernel_text_rw(void)
> {
> - set_section_perms(ro_perms, clear);
> + set_section_perms(ro_perms, clear, false);
> }
> void set_kernel_text_ro(void)
> {
> - set_section_perms(ro_perms, prot);
> + set_section_perms(ro_perms, prot, false);
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */
>
>
>
>
>
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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