[PATCH v7 7/9] seccomp: implement SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
Kees Cook
keescook at chromium.org
Tue Jun 24 11:19:27 PDT 2014
On Tue, Jun 24, 2014 at 10:08 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg at redhat.com> wrote:
> On 06/23, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> +static pid_t seccomp_can_sync_threads(void)
>> +{
>> + struct task_struct *thread, *caller;
>> +
>> + BUG_ON(write_can_lock(&tasklist_lock));
>> + BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(¤t->sighand->siglock));
>> +
>> + if (current->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER)
>> + return -EACCES;
>> +
>> + /* Validate all threads being eligible for synchronization. */
>> + thread = caller = current;
>> + for_each_thread(caller, thread) {
>
> You only need to initialize "caller" for for_each_thread(). Same for
> seccomp_sync_threads().
Thanks, I'll fix this up.
>> @@ -586,6 +701,17 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
>> if (IS_ERR(prepared))
>> return PTR_ERR(prepared);
>>
>> + /*
>> + * If we're doing thread sync, we must hold tasklist_lock
>> + * to make sure seccomp filter changes are stable on threads
>> + * entering or leaving the task list. And we must take it
>> + * before the sighand lock to avoid deadlocking.
>> + */
>> + if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
>> + write_lock_irqsave(&tasklist_lock, taskflags);
>> + else
>> + __acquire(&tasklist_lock); /* keep sparse happy */
>> +
>
> Why? ->siglock should be enough, it seems.
>
> It obviously does not protect the global process list, but *sync_threads()
> only care about current's thread group list, no?
I think I was concerned about the exit case, but reading through those
paths again, I can't find a race. Calls to put_seccomp_filter() should
already be safe. Let me see what happens if I drop the tasklist_lock
usage...
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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