[PATCH v6 6/9] seccomp: add "seccomp" syscall
Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
mtk.manpages at gmail.com
Sun Jun 15 23:08:39 PDT 2014
Hi Kees,
On Wed, Jun 11, 2014 at 5:25 AM, Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org> wrote:
> This adds the new "seccomp" syscall with both an "operation" and "flags"
> parameter for future expansion. The third argument is a pointer value,
> used with the SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation. Currently, flags must
> be 0. This is functionally equivalent to prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, ...).
I assume there'll be another iteration of these patches. With that
next iteration, could you write a man page (or at least free text
structured like a man page) that comprehensively documents the
user-space API?
Thanks,
Michael
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>
> Cc: linux-api at vger.kernel.org
> ---
> arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 +
> arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
> include/linux/syscalls.h | 2 ++
> include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 4 ++-
> include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h | 4 +++
> kernel/seccomp.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> kernel/sys_ni.c | 3 ++
> 7 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
> index d6b867921612..7527eac24122 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
> +++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
> @@ -360,3 +360,4 @@
> 351 i386 sched_setattr sys_sched_setattr
> 352 i386 sched_getattr sys_sched_getattr
> 353 i386 renameat2 sys_renameat2
> +354 i386 seccomp sys_seccomp
> diff --git a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
> index ec255a1646d2..16272a6c12b7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
> +++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
> @@ -323,6 +323,7 @@
> 314 common sched_setattr sys_sched_setattr
> 315 common sched_getattr sys_sched_getattr
> 316 common renameat2 sys_renameat2
> +317 common seccomp sys_seccomp
>
> #
> # x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact
> diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
> index b0881a0ed322..1713977ee26f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
> +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
> @@ -866,4 +866,6 @@ asmlinkage long sys_process_vm_writev(pid_t pid,
> asmlinkage long sys_kcmp(pid_t pid1, pid_t pid2, int type,
> unsigned long idx1, unsigned long idx2);
> asmlinkage long sys_finit_module(int fd, const char __user *uargs, int flags);
> +asmlinkage long sys_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
> + const char __user *uargs);
> #endif
> diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
> index 333640608087..65acbf0e2867 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
> @@ -699,9 +699,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_sched_setattr, sys_sched_setattr)
> __SYSCALL(__NR_sched_getattr, sys_sched_getattr)
> #define __NR_renameat2 276
> __SYSCALL(__NR_renameat2, sys_renameat2)
> +#define __NR_seccomp 277
> +__SYSCALL(__NR_seccomp, sys_seccomp)
>
> #undef __NR_syscalls
> -#define __NR_syscalls 277
> +#define __NR_syscalls 278
>
> /*
> * All syscalls below here should go away really,
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
> index ac2dc9f72973..b258878ba754 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
> @@ -10,6 +10,10 @@
> #define SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT 1 /* uses hard-coded filter. */
> #define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER 2 /* uses user-supplied filter. */
>
> +/* Valid operations for seccomp syscall. */
> +#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT 0
> +#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1
> +
> /*
> * All BPF programs must return a 32-bit value.
> * The bottom 16-bits are for optional return data.
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index 39d32c2904fc..c0cafa9e84af 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
> #include <linux/sched.h>
> #include <linux/seccomp.h>
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/syscalls.h>
>
> /* #define SECCOMP_DEBUG 1 */
>
> @@ -301,8 +302,8 @@ free_prog:
> *
> * Returns filter on success and ERR_PTR otherwise.
> */
> -static
> -struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_user_filter(char __user *user_filter)
> +static struct seccomp_filter *
> +seccomp_prepare_user_filter(const char __user *user_filter)
> {
> struct sock_fprog fprog;
> struct seccomp_filter *filter = ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
> @@ -325,19 +326,25 @@ out:
>
> /**
> * seccomp_attach_filter: validate and attach filter
> + * @flags: flags to change filter behavior
> * @filter: seccomp filter to add to the current process
> *
> * Caller must be holding current->sighand->siglock lock.
> *
> * Returns 0 on success, -ve on error.
> */
> -static long seccomp_attach_filter(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
> +static long seccomp_attach_filter(unsigned int flags,
> + struct seccomp_filter *filter)
> {
> unsigned long total_insns;
> struct seccomp_filter *walker;
>
> BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(¤t->sighand->siglock));
>
> + /* Validate flags. */
> + if (flags != 0)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> /* Validate resulting filter length. */
> total_insns = filter->len;
> for (walker = current->seccomp.filter; walker; walker = filter->prev)
> @@ -541,6 +548,7 @@ out:
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
> /**
> * seccomp_set_mode_filter: internal function for setting seccomp filter
> + * @flags: flags to change filter behavior
> * @filter: struct sock_fprog containing filter
> *
> * This function may be called repeatedly to install additional filters.
> @@ -551,7 +559,8 @@ out:
> *
> * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
> */
> -static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(char __user *filter)
> +static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
> + const char __user *filter)
> {
> const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER;
> struct seccomp_filter *prepared = NULL;
> @@ -569,7 +578,7 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(char __user *filter)
> if (!seccomp_check_mode(current, seccomp_mode))
> goto out;
>
> - ret = seccomp_attach_filter(prepared);
> + ret = seccomp_attach_filter(flags, prepared);
> if (ret)
> goto out;
> /* Do not free the successfully attached filter. */
> @@ -583,12 +592,35 @@ out_free:
> return ret;
> }
> #else
> -static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(char __user *filter)
> +static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
> + const char __user *filter)
> {
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> #endif
>
> +/* Common entry point for both prctl and syscall. */
> +static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
> + const char __user *uargs)
> +{
> + switch (op) {
> + case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT:
> + if (flags != 0 || uargs != NULL)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + return seccomp_set_mode_strict();
> + case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER:
> + return seccomp_set_mode_filter(flags, uargs);
> + default:
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(seccomp, unsigned int, op, unsigned int, flags,
> + const char __user *, uargs)
> +{
> + return do_seccomp(op, flags, uargs);
> +}
> +
> /**
> * prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode
> * @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use
> @@ -598,12 +630,27 @@ static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(char __user *filter)
> */
> long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
> {
> + unsigned int op;
> + char __user *uargs;
> +
> switch (seccomp_mode) {
> case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
> - return seccomp_set_mode_strict();
> + op = SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT;
> + /*
> + * Setting strict mode through prctl always ignored filter,
> + * so make sure it is always NULL here to pass the internal
> + * check in do_seccomp().
> + */
> + uargs = NULL;
> + break;
> case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
> - return seccomp_set_mode_filter(filter);
> + op = SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER;
> + uargs = filter;
> + break;
> default:
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> +
> + /* prctl interface doesn't have flags, so they are always zero. */
> + return do_seccomp(op, 0, uargs);
> }
> diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c
> index 36441b51b5df..2904a2105914 100644
> --- a/kernel/sys_ni.c
> +++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c
> @@ -213,3 +213,6 @@ cond_syscall(compat_sys_open_by_handle_at);
>
> /* compare kernel pointers */
> cond_syscall(sys_kcmp);
> +
> +/* operate on Secure Computing state */
> +cond_syscall(sys_seccomp);
> --
> 1.7.9.5
>
> --
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--
Michael Kerrisk
Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/
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