[PATCH v9 4/4] arm: ARMv7 dirty page logging 2nd stage page fault handling support

Christoffer Dall christoffer.dall at linaro.org
Mon Aug 18 05:51:05 PDT 2014


On Wed, Aug 13, 2014 at 06:20:19PM -0700, Mario Smarduch wrote:
> On 08/13/2014 12:30 AM, Christoffer Dall wrote:
> > On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 06:27:11PM -0700, Mario Smarduch wrote:
> >> On 08/12/2014 02:50 AM, Christoffer Dall wrote:
> >>> On Mon, Aug 11, 2014 at 06:25:05PM -0700, Mario Smarduch wrote:
> >>>> On 08/11/2014 12:13 PM, Christoffer Dall wrote:
> >>>>> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 05:56:08PM -0700, Mario Smarduch wrote:
> > 
> > [...]
> > 
> >>>>>> @@ -1151,7 +1170,7 @@ static void kvm_set_spte_handler(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa, void *data)
> >>>>>>  {
> >>>>>>  	pte_t *pte = (pte_t *)data;
> >>>>>>  
> >>>>>> -	stage2_set_pte(kvm, NULL, gpa, pte, false);
> >>>>>> +	stage2_set_pte(kvm, NULL, gpa, pte, false, false);
> >>>>>
> >>>>> why is logging never active if we are called from MMU notifiers?
> >>>>
> >>>> mmu notifiers update sptes, but I don't see how these updates
> >>>> can result in guest dirty pages. Also guest pages are marked dirty
> >>>> from 2nd stage page fault handlers (searching through the code).
> >>>>
> >>> Ok, then add:
> >>>
> >>> /*
> >>>  * We can always call stage2_set_pte with logging_active == false,
> >>>  * because MMU notifiers will have unmapped a huge PMD before calling
> >>>  * ->change_pte() (which in turn calls kvm_set_spte_hva()) and therefore
> >>>  * stage2_set_pte() never needs to clear out a huge PMD through this
> >>>  * calling path.
> >>>  */
> >>
> >> So here on permission change to primary pte's kernel first invalidates
> >> related s2ptes followed by ->change_pte calls to synchronize s2ptes. As
> >> consequence of invalidation we unmap huge PMDs, if a page falls in that
> >> range.
> >>
> >> Is the comment to point out use of logging flag under various scenarios?
> > 
> > The comment is because when you look at this function it is not obvious
> > why we pass logging_active=false, despite logging may actually be
> > active.  This could suggest that the parameter to stage2_set_pte()
> > should be named differently (break_huge_pmds) or something like that,
> > but we can also be satisfied with the comment.
> 
> Ok I see, I was thinking you thought it was breaking something.
> Yeah I'll add the comment, in reality this is another use case
> where a PMD may need to be converted to page table so it makes sense
> to contrast use cases.
> 

the hidden knowledge is that MMU notifiers will ensure a huge PMD gets
unmapped before trying to change the physical backing of the underlying
PTEs, so it's a gigantic kernel bug if this gets called on something
mapped with a huge PMD.


> > 
> >>
> >> Should I add comments on flag use in other places as well?
> >>
> > 
> > It's always a judgement call.  I didn't find it necessarry to put a
> > comment elsewhere because I think it's pretty obivous that we would
> > never care about logging writes to device regions.
> > 
> > However, this made me think, are we making sure that we are not marking
> > device mappings as read-only in the wp_range functions?  I think it's
> 
> KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION ioctl doesn't check type of region being
> installed/operated on (KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES), in case of QEMU
> these regions wind up in KVMState->KVMSlot[], when
> memory_region_add_subregion() is called KVM listener installs it.
> For migration and dirty page logging QEMU walks the KVMSlot[] array.
> 
> For QEMU VFIO (PCI) mmap()ing BAR of type IORESOURCE_MEM,
> causes the memory region to be added to KVMState->KVMSlot[].
> In that case it's possible to walk KVMState->KVMSlot[] issue
> the ioctl and  come across  a device mapping with normal memory and
> WP it's s2ptes (VFIO sets unmigrateble state though).
> 
> But I'm not sure what's there to stop someone calling the ioctl and
> install a region with device memory type. Most likely though if you
> installed that kind of region migration would be disabled.
> 
> But just for logging use not checking memory type could be an issue.
> 
I forgot that the current write-protect'ing is limited to the memory
region boundaries, so everything should be fine.

If user-space write-protects device memory regions, the worst
consequence is that it breaks the guest, but that's its own
responsibility, so I don't think you need to change anything.

-Christoffer



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