[PATCH 6.18 55/55] rxrpc: Fix missing validation of ticket length in non-XDR key preparsing
Greg Kroah-Hartman
gregkh at linuxfoundation.org
Fri Apr 24 06:31:34 PDT 2026
6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Anderson Nascimento <anderson at allelesecurity.com>
commit ac33733b10b484d666f97688561670afd5861383 upstream.
In rxrpc_preparse(), there are two paths for parsing key payloads: the
XDR path (for large payloads) and the non-XDR path (for payloads <= 28
bytes). While the XDR path (rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxkad()) correctly
validates the ticket length against AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX, the non-XDR
path fails to do so.
This allows an unprivileged user to provide a very large ticket length.
When this key is later read via rxrpc_read(), the total
token size (toksize) calculation results in a value that exceeds
AFSTOKEN_LENGTH_MAX, triggering a WARN_ON().
[ 2001.302904] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2108 at net/rxrpc/key.c:778 rxrpc_read+0x109/0x5c0 [rxrpc]
Fix this by adding a check in the non-XDR parsing path of rxrpc_preparse()
to ensure the ticket length does not exceed AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX,
bringing it into parity with the XDR parsing logic.
Fixes: 8a7a3eb4ddbe ("KEYS: RxRPC: Use key preparsing")
Fixes: 84924aac08a4 ("rxrpc: Fix checker warning")
Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson at allelesecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson at allelesecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne at auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman at auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms at kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs at lists.infradead.org
cc: stable at kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422161438.2593376-7-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba at kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/rxrpc/key.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- a/net/rxrpc/key.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/key.c
@@ -502,6 +502,10 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse(struct key_pre
if (v1->security_index != RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD)
goto error;
+ ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+ if (v1->ticket_length > AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX)
+ goto error;
+
plen = sizeof(*token->kad) + v1->ticket_length;
prep->quotalen += plen + sizeof(*token);
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