Patch "rxrpc: Fix missing error checks for rxkad encryption/decryption failure" has been added to the 6.18-stable tree
gregkh at linuxfoundation.org
gregkh at linuxfoundation.org
Mon Apr 13 05:39:05 PDT 2026
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
rxrpc: Fix missing error checks for rxkad encryption/decryption failure
to the 6.18-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
rxrpc-fix-missing-error-checks-for-rxkad-encryption-decryption-failure.patch
and it can be found in the queue-6.18 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable at vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From f93af41b9f5f798823d0d0fb8765c2a936d76270 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 13:12:44 +0100
Subject: rxrpc: Fix missing error checks for rxkad encryption/decryption failure
From: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
commit f93af41b9f5f798823d0d0fb8765c2a936d76270 upstream.
Add error checking for failure of crypto_skcipher_en/decrypt() to various
rxkad function as the crypto functions can fail with ENOMEM at least.
Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne at auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman at auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms at kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs at lists.infradead.org
cc: stable at kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-17-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba at kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
--- a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
@@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ static int rxkad_prime_packet_security(s
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
__be32 *tmpbuf;
size_t tmpsize = 4 * sizeof(__be32);
+ int ret;
_enter("");
@@ -225,13 +226,13 @@ static int rxkad_prime_packet_security(s
skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, ci);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, tmpsize, iv.x);
- crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
skcipher_request_free(req);
memcpy(&conn->rxkad.csum_iv, tmpbuf + 2, sizeof(conn->rxkad.csum_iv));
kfree(tmpbuf);
- _leave(" = 0");
- return 0;
+ _leave(" = %d", ret);
+ return ret;
}
/*
@@ -264,6 +265,7 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet_auth(cons
struct scatterlist sg;
size_t pad;
u16 check;
+ int ret;
_enter("");
@@ -286,11 +288,11 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet_auth(cons
skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, call->conn->rxkad.cipher);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, 8, iv.x);
- crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
- _leave(" = 0");
- return 0;
+ _leave(" = %d", ret);
+ return ret;
}
/*
@@ -345,7 +347,7 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet(struct rx
union {
__be32 buf[2];
} crypto __aligned(8);
- u32 x, y;
+ u32 x, y = 0;
int ret;
_enter("{%d{%x}},{#%u},%u,",
@@ -376,8 +378,10 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet(struct rx
skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, call->conn->rxkad.cipher);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, 8, iv.x);
- crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
y = ntohl(crypto.buf[1]);
y = (y >> 16) & 0xffff;
@@ -413,6 +417,7 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet(struct rx
memset(p + txb->pkt_len, 0, gap);
}
+out:
skcipher_request_free(req);
_leave(" = %d [set %x]", ret, y);
return ret;
@@ -453,8 +458,10 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(struct
skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, call->conn->rxkad.cipher);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, 8, iv.x);
- crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
/* Extract the decrypted packet length */
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sp->offset, &sechdr, sizeof(sechdr)) < 0)
@@ -531,10 +538,14 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct
skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, call->conn->rxkad.cipher);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, sp->len, iv.x);
- crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
if (sg != _sg)
kfree(sg);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(ret != -ENOMEM);
+ return ret;
+ }
/* Extract the decrypted packet length */
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sp->offset, &sechdr, sizeof(sechdr)) < 0)
@@ -602,8 +613,10 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet(struct rx
skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, call->conn->rxkad.cipher);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, 8, iv.x);
- crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
y = ntohl(crypto.buf[1]);
cksum = (y >> 16) & 0xffff;
@@ -1077,21 +1090,23 @@ static int rxkad_decrypt_ticket(struct r
/*
* decrypt the response packet
*/
-static void rxkad_decrypt_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
- struct rxkad_response *resp,
- const struct rxrpc_crypt *session_key)
+static int rxkad_decrypt_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
+ struct rxkad_response *resp,
+ const struct rxrpc_crypt *session_key)
{
struct skcipher_request *req = rxkad_ci_req;
struct scatterlist sg[1];
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
+ int ret;
_enter(",,%08x%08x",
ntohl(session_key->n[0]), ntohl(session_key->n[1]));
mutex_lock(&rxkad_ci_mutex);
- if (crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(rxkad_ci, session_key->x,
- sizeof(*session_key)) < 0)
- BUG();
+ ret = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(rxkad_ci, session_key->x,
+ sizeof(*session_key));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto unlock;
memcpy(&iv, session_key, sizeof(iv));
@@ -1100,12 +1115,14 @@ static void rxkad_decrypt_response(struc
skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, rxkad_ci);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, sizeof(resp->encrypted), iv.x);
- crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
+unlock:
mutex_unlock(&rxkad_ci_mutex);
_leave("");
+ return ret;
}
/*
@@ -1198,7 +1215,9 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct
/* use the session key from inside the ticket to decrypt the
* response */
- rxkad_decrypt_response(conn, response, &session_key);
+ ret = rxkad_decrypt_response(conn, response, &session_key);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto temporary_error_free_ticket;
if (ntohl(response->encrypted.epoch) != conn->proto.epoch ||
ntohl(response->encrypted.cid) != conn->proto.cid ||
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dhowells at redhat.com are
queue-6.18/rxrpc-fix-rxgk-token-loading-to-check-bounds.patch
queue-6.18/rxrpc-only-put-the-call-ref-if-one-was-acquired.patch
queue-6.18/rxrpc-proc-size-address-buffers-for-pispc-output.patch
queue-6.18/rxrpc-fix-buffer-overread-in-rxgk_do_verify_authenticator.patch
queue-6.18/rxrpc-reject-undecryptable-rxkad-response-tickets.patch
queue-6.18/rxrpc-fix-missing-error-checks-for-rxkad-encryption-decryption-failure.patch
queue-6.18/rxrpc-fix-use-of-wrong-skb-when-comparing-queued-resp-challenge-serial.patch
queue-6.18/rxrpc-fix-integer-overflow-in-rxgk_verify_response.patch
queue-6.18/rxrpc-fix-reference-count-leak-in-rxrpc_server_keyring.patch
queue-6.18/rxrpc-fix-key-reference-count-leak-from-call-key.patch
queue-6.18/rxrpc-fix-leak-of-rxgk-context-in-rxgk_verify_response.patch
queue-6.18/rxrpc-fix-anonymous-key-handling.patch
queue-6.18/rxrpc-fix-to-request-an-ack-if-window-is-limited.patch
queue-6.18/rxrpc-fix-call-removal-to-use-rcu-safe-deletion.patch
queue-6.18/rxrpc-fix-key-quota-calculation-for-multitoken-keys.patch
queue-6.18/mm-filemap-fix-nr_pages-calculation-overflow-in-filemap_map_pages.patch
queue-6.18/rxrpc-fix-key-parsing-memleak.patch
queue-6.18/rxrpc-fix-rack-timer-warning-to-report-unexpected-mode.patch
queue-6.18/rxrpc-fix-response-authenticator-parser-oob-read.patch
queue-6.18/rxrpc-fix-key-keyring-checks-in-setsockopt-rxrpc_security_key-keyring.patch
queue-6.18/rxrpc-fix-oversized-response-authenticator-length-check.patch
queue-6.18/rxrpc-only-handle-response-during-service-challenge.patch
More information about the linux-afs
mailing list