[openwrt/openwrt] openssl: update to 3.0.9
LEDE Commits
lede-commits at lists.infradead.org
Fri Jun 9 04:37:28 PDT 2023
hauke pushed a commit to openwrt/openwrt.git, branch openwrt-23.05:
https://git.openwrt.org/e1d59497e9d0104388a58ceda770afcc087a6c37
commit e1d59497e9d0104388a58ceda770afcc087a6c37
Author: Ivan Pavlov <AuthorReflex at gmail.com>
AuthorDate: Sun Jun 4 22:34:39 2023 +0300
openssl: update to 3.0.9
CVE-2023-2650 fix
Remove upstreamed patches
Major changes between OpenSSL 3.0.8 and OpenSSL 3.0.9 [30 May 2023]
* Mitigate for very slow OBJ_obj2txt() performance with gigantic OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identities. (CVE-2023-2650)
* Fixed buffer overread in AES-XTS decryption on ARM 64 bit platforms (CVE-2023-1255)
* Fixed documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() (CVE-2023-0466)
* Fixed handling of invalid certificate policies in leaf certificates (CVE-2023-0465)
* Limited the number of nodes created in a policy tree (CVE-2023-0464)
Signed-off-by: Ivan Pavlov <AuthorReflex at gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6348850f10545aac70db94d3a9555a4f2eb84281)
---
package/libs/openssl/Makefile | 6 +-
.../patches/120-strip-cflags-from-binary.patch | 2 +-
...ive-resource-use-verifying-policy-constra.patch | 207 ---------------------
...-EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY-is-checked-even-in.patch | 44 -----
...pl-Avoid-buffer-overrread-in-AES-XTS-decr.patch | 39 ----
5 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 294 deletions(-)
diff --git a/package/libs/openssl/Makefile b/package/libs/openssl/Makefile
index 66ababab3c..a34a784973 100644
--- a/package/libs/openssl/Makefile
+++ b/package/libs/openssl/Makefile
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=openssl
-PKG_VERSION:=3.0.8
-PKG_RELEASE:=10
+PKG_VERSION:=3.0.9
+PKG_RELEASE:=1
PKG_BUILD_FLAGS:=no-mips16 gc-sections
PKG_BUILD_PARALLEL:=1
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ PKG_SOURCE_URL:= \
ftp://ftp.pca.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/openssl/source/ \
ftp://ftp.pca.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/openssl/source/old/$(PKG_BASE)/
-PKG_HASH:=6c13d2bf38fdf31eac3ce2a347073673f5d63263398f1f69d0df4a41253e4b3e
+PKG_HASH:=eb1ab04781474360f77c318ab89d8c5a03abc38e63d65a603cabbf1b00a1dc90
PKG_LICENSE:=Apache-2.0
PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=LICENSE
diff --git a/package/libs/openssl/patches/120-strip-cflags-from-binary.patch b/package/libs/openssl/patches/120-strip-cflags-from-binary.patch
index e9f4fc131a..c4f2540395 100644
--- a/package/libs/openssl/patches/120-strip-cflags-from-binary.patch
+++ b/package/libs/openssl/patches/120-strip-cflags-from-binary.patch
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github at yahoo.com>
--- a/crypto/build.info
+++ b/crypto/build.info
-@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ DEFINE[../libcrypto]=$UPLINKDEF
+@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ DEFINE[../libcrypto]=$UPLINKDEF
DEPEND[info.o]=buildinf.h
DEPEND[cversion.o]=buildinf.h
diff --git a/package/libs/openssl/patches/200-x509-excessive-resource-use-verifying-policy-constra.patch b/package/libs/openssl/patches/200-x509-excessive-resource-use-verifying-policy-constra.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 927634c0a7..0000000000
--- a/package/libs/openssl/patches/200-x509-excessive-resource-use-verifying-policy-constra.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
-From 959c59c7a0164117e7f8366466a32bb1f8d77ff1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Pauli <pauli at openssl.org>
-Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2023 15:28:20 +1100
-Subject: [PATCH] x509: excessive resource use verifying policy constraints
-
-A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions
-of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains
-that include policy constraints. Attackers may be able to exploit this
-vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that triggers
-exponential use of computational resources, leading to a denial-of-service
-(DoS) attack on affected systems.
-
-Fixes CVE-2023-0464
-
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas at openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis at oracle.com>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20568)
-
---- a/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h
-+++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h
-@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st {
- };
-
- struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st {
-+ /* The number of nodes in the tree */
-+ size_t node_count;
-+ /* The maximum number of nodes in the tree */
-+ size_t node_maximum;
-+
- /* This is the tree 'level' data */
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels;
- int nlevel;
-@@ -157,7 +162,8 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_tree_find_
- X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
- X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
- X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
-- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree);
-+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
-+ int extra_data);
- void ossl_policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node);
- int ossl_policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl,
- const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid);
---- a/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c
-+++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c
-@@ -59,10 +59,15 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_find
- X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
- X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
- X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
-- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
-+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
-+ int extra_data)
- {
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
-
-+ /* Verify that the tree isn't too large. This mitigates CVE-2023-0464 */
-+ if (tree->node_maximum > 0 && tree->node_count >= tree->node_maximum)
-+ return NULL;
-+
- node = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*node));
- if (node == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-@@ -70,7 +75,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_
- }
- node->data = data;
- node->parent = parent;
-- if (level) {
-+ if (level != NULL) {
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) {
- if (level->anyPolicy)
- goto node_error;
-@@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_
- }
- }
-
-- if (tree) {
-+ if (extra_data) {
- if (tree->extra_data == NULL)
- tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null();
- if (tree->extra_data == NULL){
-@@ -103,6 +108,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_
- }
- }
-
-+ tree->node_count++;
- if (parent)
- parent->nchild++;
-
---- a/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c
-+++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c
-@@ -14,6 +14,17 @@
-
- #include "pcy_local.h"
-
-+/*
-+ * If the maximum number of nodes in the policy tree isn't defined, set it to
-+ * a generous default of 1000 nodes.
-+ *
-+ * Defining this to be zero means unlimited policy tree growth which opens the
-+ * door on CVE-2023-0464.
-+ */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX
-+# define OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX 1000
-+#endif
-+
- static void expected_print(BIO *channel,
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev, X509_POLICY_NODE *node,
- int indent)
-@@ -163,6 +174,9 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **
- return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
- }
-
-+ /* Limit the growth of the tree to mitigate CVE-2023-0464 */
-+ tree->node_maximum = OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX;
-+
- /*
- * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3.
- *
-@@ -180,7 +194,7 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **
- if ((data = ossl_policy_data_new(NULL,
- OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL)
- goto bad_tree;
-- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) {
-+ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree, 1) == NULL) {
- ossl_policy_data_free(data);
- goto bad_tree;
- }
-@@ -239,7 +253,8 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **
- * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
- */
- static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
-- X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
-+ X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
-+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
- {
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
- int i, matched = 0;
-@@ -249,13 +264,13 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
-
- if (ossl_policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
-- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL)
-+ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 0) == NULL)
- return 0;
- matched = 1;
- }
- }
- if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
-- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
-+ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-@@ -268,7 +283,8 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509
- * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
- */
- static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
-- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
-+ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
-+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
- {
- int i;
-
-@@ -276,7 +292,7 @@ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_L
- X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
-
- /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */
-- if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data))
-+ if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data, tree))
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-@@ -307,7 +323,7 @@ static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLIC
- /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
- data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
- data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
-- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) {
-+ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 1) == NULL) {
- ossl_policy_data_free(data);
- return 0;
- }
-@@ -370,7 +386,7 @@ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEV
- /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
- if (last->anyPolicy &&
- ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy,
-- last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
-+ last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
- return 0;
- return 1;
- }
-@@ -553,7 +569,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_
- extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
- | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
- node = ossl_policy_level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent,
-- tree);
-+ tree, 1);
- }
- if (!tree->user_policies) {
- tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
-@@ -580,7 +596,7 @@ static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TRE
-
- for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
- cache = ossl_policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
-- if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
-+ if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache, tree))
- return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
-
- if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
diff --git a/package/libs/openssl/patches/210-Ensure-that-EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY-is-checked-even-in.patch b/package/libs/openssl/patches/210-Ensure-that-EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY-is-checked-even-in.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 01819c15a8..0000000000
--- a/package/libs/openssl/patches/210-Ensure-that-EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY-is-checked-even-in.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From 1dd43e0709fece299b15208f36cc7c76209ba0bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
-Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 16:52:55 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Ensure that EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY is checked even in leaf
- certs
-
-Even though we check the leaf cert to confirm it is valid, we
-later ignored the invalid flag and did not notice that the leaf
-cert was bad.
-
-Fixes: CVE-2023-0465
-
-Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau at openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas at openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20587)
-
---- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
-+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
-@@ -1654,15 +1654,23 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *
- goto memerr;
- /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
- if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
-- int i;
-+ int i, cbcalled = 0;
-
- /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
-- for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
-+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
- X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
-
-+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0)
-+ cbcalled = 1;
- CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
- }
-+ if (!cbcalled) {
-+ /* Should not be able to get here */
-+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */
- return 1;
- }
- if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
diff --git a/package/libs/openssl/patches/220-aesv8-armx.pl-Avoid-buffer-overrread-in-AES-XTS-decr.patch b/package/libs/openssl/patches/220-aesv8-armx.pl-Avoid-buffer-overrread-in-AES-XTS-decr.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d6a45aec21..0000000000
--- a/package/libs/openssl/patches/220-aesv8-armx.pl-Avoid-buffer-overrread-in-AES-XTS-decr.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From 02ac9c9420275868472f33b01def01218742b8bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tomas Mraz <tomas at openssl.org>
-Date: Mon, 17 Apr 2023 16:51:20 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] aesv8-armx.pl: Avoid buffer overrread in AES-XTS decryption
-
-Original author: Nevine Ebeid (Amazon)
-Fixes: CVE-2023-1255
-
-The buffer overread happens on decrypts of 4 mod 5 sizes.
-Unless the memory just after the buffer is unmapped this is harmless.
-
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli at openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove at arm.com>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20759)
-
-(cherry picked from commit 72dfe46550ee1f1bbfacd49f071419365bc23304)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
-index 6a7bf05d1b..bd583e2c89 100755
---- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
-+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
-@@ -3353,7 +3353,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
- .align 4
- .Lxts_dec_tail4x:
- add $inp,$inp,#16
-- vld1.32 {$dat0},[$inp],#16
-+ tst $tailcnt,#0xf
- veor $tmp1,$dat1,$tmp0
- vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16
- veor $tmp2,$dat2,$tmp2
-@@ -3362,6 +3362,8 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
- veor $tmp4,$dat4,$tmp4
- vst1.8 {$tmp3-$tmp4},[$out],#32
-
-+ b.eq .Lxts_dec_abort
-+ vld1.32 {$dat0},[$inp],#16
- b .Lxts_done
- .align 4
- .Lxts_outer_dec_tail:
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