[RFC PATCH 01/37] KVM: x86/mmu: Store the address space ID directly in kvm_mmu_page_role
Paolo Bonzini
pbonzini at redhat.com
Mon Dec 12 14:50:29 PST 2022
On 12/12/22 18:39, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>> The notion of address spaces is already existing architecture-neutral
>> concept in KVM (e.g. see uses of KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM in
>> virt/kvm/kvm_main.c), although SMM is the only use-case I'm aware of.
>
> Yes, SMM is currently the only use-case.
It's possible that in the future Hyper-V VTLs will also have per-level
protections. It wouldn't use as_id, but it would likely be recorded in
the upper byte of the role.
I'm not sure if Microsoft intends to port those to ARM as well.
> My preference would be to leave .smm in x86's page role
What about defining a byte of arch_role and a macro to build it?
> Unless I'm missing something, e.g. a need to map GPAs differently for
> SMM vs. non-SMM, SMM could have been implemented with a simple flag
> in a memslot to mark the memslot as SMM-only.
Unfortunately not, because there can be another region (for example
video RAM at 0A0000h) underneath SMRAM.
In fact, KVM_MEM_X86_SMRAM was the first idea. It was uglier than
multiple address spaces
(https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1431084034-8425-1-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com).
In retrospect there were probably ways to mix the best of the two
designs, but it wasn't generic enough.
> And separate address spaces become truly nasty if the CPU can access multiple
> protected regions, e.g. if the CPU can access type X and type Y at the same time,
> then there would need to be memslots for "regular", X, Y, and X+Y.
Without a usecase that's hard to say. It's just as possible that there
would be a natural hierarchy of levels.
Paolo
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