[PATCH kexec-tools 0/3] kexec: bounds and validation fixes for uImage and PE zboot

Simon Horman horms at kernel.org
Tue Nov 10 03:35:15 PST 2026


Hi,

This series addresses two bounds validation issues reported by Tristan
when processing untrusted or corrupted kernel images in kexec-tools:

1. In uImage_gz_load(), optional gzip header fields (EXTRA_FIELD,
   ORIG_NAME, COMMENT, HEAD_CRC) were parsed using unbounded scans and
   offset arithmetic without verifying whether the computed offset stayed
   within the input buffer. This could lead to out-of-bounds heap reads
   or buffer length underflow, crashing kexec.

   Patch 1 first refactors uImage_gz_load() to use a common goto unwind
   path for freeing the decompression buffer on error.
   Patch 2 adds the necessary bounds and length checks.

2. In pez_prepare(), payload_offset and payload_size are 32-bit values
   read from untrusted PE zboot headers. Adding them directly could wrap
   around, bypassing the bounds check and causing an out-of-bounds read
   when staging the payload.

   Patch 3 checks that the buffer is large enough for the header and
   avoids wrap-around by using defensive subtraction.

---
Simon Horman (3):
      uImage: use goto for unwind in uImage_gz_load
      uImage: add bounds checks when parsing gzip headers in uImage_gz_load()
      pe-zboot: fix integer overflow in payload bounds check in pez_prepare()

 kexec/kexec-pe-zboot.c |  6 ++++-
 kexec/kexec-uImage.c   | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

base-commit: 0fd0d8e9ea975696fdc05ad267a65f3efd415612




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