[PATCH 3/3] /dev/mem: Do not map unaccepted memory

[Dave Hansen]

On 9/7/23 07:25, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 07, 2023 at 07:15:21AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
>> On 9/6/23 00:39, Adrian Hunter wrote:
>>> Support for unaccepted memory was added recently, refer commit
>>> dcdfdd40fa82 ("mm: Add support for unaccepted memory"), whereby
>>> a virtual machine may need to accept memory before it can be used.
>>>
>>> Do not map unaccepted memory because it can cause the guest to fail.
>> Doesn't /dev/mem already provide a billion ways for someone to shoot
>> themselves in the foot?  TDX seems to have added the 1,000,000,001st.
>> Is this really worth patching?
> Is it better to let TD die silently? I don't think so.

First, let's take a look at all of the distro kernels that folks will
run under TDX.  Do they have STRICT_DEVMEM set?

> config STRICT_DEVMEM
...
>           If this option is switched on, and IO_STRICT_DEVMEM=n, the /dev/mem
>           file only allows userspace access to PCI space and the BIOS code and
>           data regions.  This is sufficient for dosemu and X and all common
>           users of /dev/mem.

Can a line of code in this patch even run in the face of IO_STRICT_DEVMEM=y?

I think basically everybody sets that option and has for over a decade.
If there are any distros out there _not_ setting this, we should
probably have a chat with them to find out more.

I suspect any practical use of this patch is limited to folks who:

1. Compile sensible security-related options out of their kernel
2. Go and reads random pages with /dev/mem in their "secure" VM

They get to hold the pieces, and they can and will get a notification
from their VMM that the VM did something nasty.

BTW, Ubuntu at least also sets HARDENED_USERCOPY which will *also*
enable STRICT_DEVMEM.  So someone would have to _really_ go to some
trouble to shoot themselves in the foot here.  If they're _that_
determined, it would be a shame to thwart their efforts with this patch.