[PATCH v2] x86/kexec: Add EFI config table identity mapping for kexec kernel

[Tao Liu]

Hi Borislav,

On Sat, Jul 29, 2023 at 12:56 AM Borislav Petkov <bp at alien8.de> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jul 27, 2023 at 07:03:26PM +0800, Tao Liu wrote:
> > Hi Borislav,
> >
> > Sorry for the late response. I spent some time retesting your patch
> > against 6.5.0-rc1 and 6.5.0-rc3, and it is OK. So
> >
> > Reported-and-tested-by: Tao Liu <ltao at redhat.com>
> >
> > And will we use this patch as a workaround or will we wait for a
> > better solution as proposed by Michael?
>
> First of all, please do not top-post.
>

OK, thanks for the reminder.

> And yes, here's a better one. I'd appreciate it you testing it.
>

Thanks for the patch! I have tested it on the lenovo machine in the
past few days, no issue found, so the patch tests OK.

Thanks,
Tao Liu

> Thx.
>
> ---
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c |  5 ++++-
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c    | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c
> index 6debb816e83d..0f03ac12e2a6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c
> @@ -63,7 +63,10 @@ void load_stage2_idt(void)
>         set_idt_entry(X86_TRAP_PF, boot_page_fault);
>
>  #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> -       set_idt_entry(X86_TRAP_VC, boot_stage2_vc);
> +       if (sev_status & BIT(1))
> +               set_idt_entry(X86_TRAP_VC, boot_stage2_vc);
> +       else
> +               set_idt_entry(X86_TRAP_VC, NULL);
>  #endif
>
>         load_boot_idt(&boot_idt_desc);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> index 09dc8c187b3c..c3e343bd4760 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> @@ -404,13 +404,46 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>         if (bp)
>                 bp->cc_blob_address = 0;
>
> +       /*
> +        * Do an initial SEV capability check before snp_init() which
> +        * loads the CPUID page and the same checks afterwards are done
> +        * without the hypervisor and are trustworthy.
> +        *
> +        * If the HV fakes SEV support, the guest will crash'n'burn
> +        * which is good enough.
> +        */
> +
> +       /* Check for the SME/SEV support leaf */
> +       eax = 0x80000000;
> +       ecx = 0;
> +       native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> +       if (eax < 0x8000001f)
> +               return;
> +
> +       /*
> +        * Check for the SME/SEV feature:
> +        *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX]
> +        *   - Bit 0 - Secure Memory Encryption support
> +        *   - Bit 1 - Secure Encrypted Virtualization support
> +        *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX]
> +        *   - Bits 5:0 - Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
> +        */
> +       eax = 0x8000001f;
> +       ecx = 0;
> +       native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> +       /* Check whether SEV is supported */
> +       if (!(eax & BIT(1)))
> +               return;
> +
>         /*
>          * Setup/preliminary detection of SNP. This will be sanity-checked
>          * against CPUID/MSR values later.
>          */
>         snp = snp_init(bp);
>
> -       /* Check for the SME/SEV support leaf */
> +       /* Now repeat the checks with the SNP CPUID table. */
> +
> +       /* Recheck the SME/SEV support leaf */
>         eax = 0x80000000;
>         ecx = 0;
>         native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> @@ -418,7 +451,7 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>                 return;
>
>         /*
> -        * Check for the SME/SEV feature:
> +        * Recheck for the SME/SEV feature:
>          *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX]
>          *   - Bit 0 - Secure Memory Encryption support
>          *   - Bit 1 - Secure Encrypted Virtualization support
> --
> 2.41.0
>
> --
> Regards/Gruss,
>     Boris.
>
> https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
>