[PATCH] util_lib/elf_info: harden parsing of printk buffer
Philipp Rudo
prudo at redhat.com
Wed Mar 23 08:35:36 PDT 2022
The old printk mechanism (> v3.5.0 and < v5.10.0) had a fixed size
buffer (log_buf) that contains all messages. The location for the next
message is stored in log_next_idx. In case the log_buf runs full
log_next_idx wraps around and starts overwriting old messages at the
beginning of the buffer. The wraparound is denoted by a message with
msg->len == 0.
Following the behavior described above blindly is dangerous as e.g. a
memory corruption could overwrite (parts of) the log_buf. If the
corruption adds a message with msg->len == 0 this leads to an endless
loop when dumping the dmesg. Fix this by verifying that not wrapped
around before when it encounters a message with msg->len == 0.
While at it also verify that the index is within the log_buf and thus
guard against corruptions with msg->len != 0.
The same bug has been reported and fixed in makedumpfile [1].
[1] http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/kexec/2022-March/024272.html
Signed-off-by: Philipp Rudo <prudo at redhat.com>
---
util_lib/elf_info.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/util_lib/elf_info.c b/util_lib/elf_info.c
index d252eff..ce71c60 100644
--- a/util_lib/elf_info.c
+++ b/util_lib/elf_info.c
@@ -763,8 +763,9 @@ static void dump_dmesg_structured(int fd, void (*handler)(char*, unsigned int))
{
#define OUT_BUF_SIZE 4096
uint64_t log_buf, log_buf_offset, ts_nsec;
- uint32_t log_first_idx, log_next_idx, current_idx, len = 0, i;
+ uint32_t log_buf_len, log_first_idx, log_next_idx, current_idx, len = 0, i;
char *buf, out_buf[OUT_BUF_SIZE];
+ bool has_wrapped_around = false;
ssize_t ret;
char *msg;
uint16_t text_len;
@@ -811,6 +812,7 @@ static void dump_dmesg_structured(int fd, void (*handler)(char*, unsigned int))
}
log_buf = read_file_pointer(fd, vaddr_to_offset(log_buf_vaddr));
+ log_buf_len = read_file_s32(fd, vaddr_to_offset(log_buf_len_vaddr));
log_first_idx = read_file_u32(fd, vaddr_to_offset(log_first_idx_vaddr));
log_next_idx = read_file_u32(fd, vaddr_to_offset(log_next_idx_vaddr));
@@ -882,11 +884,31 @@ static void dump_dmesg_structured(int fd, void (*handler)(char*, unsigned int))
* and read the message at the start of the buffer.
*/
loglen = struct_val_u16(buf, log_offset_len);
- if (!loglen)
+ if (!loglen) {
+ if (has_wrapped_around) {
+ if (len && handler)
+ handler(out_buf, len);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Cycle when parsing dmesg detected.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "The prink log_buf is most likely corrupted.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "log_buf = 0x%lx, idx = 0x%x\n",
+ log_buf, current_idx);
+ exit(68);
+ }
current_idx = 0;
- else
+ has_wrapped_around = true;
+ } else {
/* Move to next record */
current_idx += loglen;
+ if(current_idx > log_buf_len - log_sz) {
+ if (len && handler)
+ handler(out_buf, len);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Index outside log_buf detected.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "The prink log_buf is most likely corrupted.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "log_buf = 0x%lx, idx = 0x%x\n",
+ log_buf, current_idx);
+ exit(69);
+ }
+ }
}
free(buf);
if (len && handler)
--
2.35.1
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