[PATCH v1] proc/vmcore: fix clearing user buffer by properly using clear_user()

[Baoquan He]

On 11/12/21 at 10:08am, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> > > "that allows supervisor mode programs to optionally set user-space
> > > memory mappings so that access to those mappings from supervisor mode
> > > will cause a trap. This makes it harder for malicious programs to
> > > "trick" the kernel into using instructions or data from a user-space
> > > program"
> >
> > OK, probably. I thought it's triggered in access_ok(), and tried to
> > figure out why. But seems we should do something to check this in
> > access_ok(), otherwise the logic of clear_user/_clear_user is not so
> > reasonable. Anyway, I have learned it, thanks a lot for digging it out.
> >
> > By the way, I can't open above wiki article, found below commit from
> > hpa. Maybe we can add some into log to tell this, not strong opinin,
> > leave it to you.
> 
> Yes, now that we know the root cause I'll add some more details to the
> patch description and resend -- thanks Baoquan!

Thanks for sending v2.