[Query] ARM64 kaslr support - randomness, seeding and kdump

Bhupesh Sharma bhsharma at redhat.com
Fri Mar 16 02:35:10 PDT 2018

On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 11:54 PM, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland at arm.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 11:10:53AM +0900, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
>> If kaslr-seed has a critical value in terms of security, is kexec-tools
>> a right place? It is exposed to user space albeit for a short time of period.
> The kernel zeroes the seed in the DT at boot time, so the current seed
> isn't visible to userspace.
> If kexec-tools generates a seed, and inserts it into the DTB that it
> loads, this is only visible to kexec tools or other applications which
> can inspect its memory, so I don't think this is much of a concern.
> Anything with such privilege can presumably kexec() to arbitrary code
> anyhow.
> The next kernel will then zero its seed in the DT at boot time, so
> similarly this won't be visible to userspace on the new kernel.
> FWIW, having kexec tools generate a seed for the kexec_load() case makes
> sense to me.

Fair enough. I will try to take a stab at the same and come back with
my findings on this thread.


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