[PATCH v4 0/8] kexec/firmware: support system wide policy requiring signatures

Serge E. Hallyn serge at hallyn.com
Mon Jun 4 12:32:15 PDT 2018


Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> On Tue, 2018-05-29 at 14:01 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > Instead of adding the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook - or defining a
> > wrapper for security_kernel_read_file LSM hook and adding it, or
> > renaming the existing hook to security_kernel_read_data() and adding it
> > - in places where the kernel isn't reading a file, this version of the
> > patch set defines a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data().
> > 
> > The new LSM hook does not replace the existing security_kernel_read_file
> > LSM hook, which is still needed, but defines a new LSM hook allowing
> > LSMs and IMA-appraisal the opportunity to fail loading userspace
> > provided file/data.
> > 
> > The only difference between the two LSM hooks is the LSM hook name and a
> > file descriptor.  Whether this is cause enough for requiring a new LSM
> > hook, is left to the security community.
> 
> Paul does not have a preference as to adding a new LSM hook or calling
> the existing hook.  Either way is fine, as long as both the new and
> existing hooks call the existing function.
> 
> Casey didn't like the idea of a wrapper.
> James suggested renaming the LSM hook.
> 
> The maintainers for the callers of the LSM hook prefer a meaningful
> LSM hook name.  The "null" argument is not as much of a concern.  Only
> Eric seems to be asking for a separate, new LSM hook, without the
> "null" argument.
> 
> Unless someone really objects, to accommodate Eric we'll define a new
> LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data.  Eric, are you planning on

I'm confused - isn't that what this patchset did? :)

> Ack'ing patches 1 & 2?
> 
> Mimi



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