[PATCH 14/14] arm64: kexec_file: add vmlinux format support
AKASHI Takahiro
takahiro.akashi at linaro.org
Thu Aug 24 01:18:11 PDT 2017
The first PT_LOAD segment, which is assumed to be "text" code, in vmlinux
will be loaded at the offset of TEXT_OFFSET from the begining of system
memory. The other PT_LOAD segments are placed relative to the first one.
Regarding kernel verification, since there is no standard way to contain
a signature within elf binary, we follow PowerPC's (not yet upstreamed)
approach, that is, appending a signature right after the kernel binary
itself like module signing.
This way, the signature can be easily retrieved and verified with
verify_pkcs7_signature().
We can sign the kernel with sign-file command.
Unlike PowerPC, we don't support ima-based kexec for now since arm64
doesn't have any secure solution for system appraisal at this moment.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi at linaro.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas at arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon at arm.com>
---
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 8 ++
arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec_file.h | 1 +
arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 1 +
arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_elf.c | 216 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 3 +
5 files changed, 229 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_elf.c
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index c8f603700bdd..94021e66b826 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -772,11 +772,19 @@ config KEXEC_FILE_IMAGE_FMT
---help---
Select this option to enable 'Image' kernel loading.
+config KEXEC_FILE_ELF_FMT
+ bool "Enable vmlinux/elf support"
+ depends on KEXEC_FILE
+ select KEXEC_FILE_ELF
+ ---help---
+ Select this option to enable 'vmlinux' kernel loading.
+
config KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
depends on KEXEC_FILE
select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
select SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION if KEXEC_FILE_IMAGE_FMT
+ select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT if KEXEC_FILE_ELF_FMT
---help---
This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
the kexec_file_load() syscall.
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec_file.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec_file.h
index 5df899aa0d2e..eaf2adc1121c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec_file.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec_file.h
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
#define _ASM_KEXEC_FILE_H
extern struct kexec_file_ops kexec_image_ops;
+extern struct kexec_file_ops kexec_elf64_ops;
/**
* struct arm64_image_header - arm64 kernel image header.
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
index a1161bab6810..1463337160ea 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE) += machine_kexec.o relocate_kernel.o \
cpu-reset.o
arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE) += machine_kexec_file.o
arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE_IMAGE_FMT) += kexec_image.o
+arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE_ELF_FMT) += kexec_elf.o
arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64_RELOC_TEST) += arm64-reloc-test.o
arm64-reloc-test-y := reloc_test_core.o reloc_test_syms.o
arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP) += crash_dump.o
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_elf.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_elf.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7bd3c1e1f65a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_elf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+/*
+ * Kexec vmlinux loader
+
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 Linaro Limited
+ * Authors: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi at linaro.org>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kexec_file(elf): " fmt
+
+#include <linux/elf.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kexec.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
+#include <asm/byteorder.h>
+#include <asm/kexec_file.h>
+#include <asm/memory.h>
+
+static int elf64_probe(const char *buf, unsigned long len)
+{
+ struct elfhdr ehdr;
+
+ /* Check for magic and architecture */
+ memcpy(&ehdr, buf, sizeof(ehdr));
+ if (memcmp(ehdr.e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG) ||
+ (elf16_to_cpu(&ehdr, ehdr.e_machine) != EM_AARCH64))
+ return -ENOEXEC;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int elf_exec_load(struct kimage *image, struct elfhdr *ehdr,
+ struct elf_info *elf_info,
+ unsigned long *kernel_load_addr)
+{
+ struct kexec_buf kbuf;
+ const struct elf_phdr *phdr;
+ const struct arm64_image_header *h;
+ unsigned long text_offset, rand_offset;
+ unsigned long page_offset, phys_offset;
+ int first_segment, i, ret = -ENOEXEC;
+
+ kbuf.image = image;
+ if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) {
+ kbuf.buf_min = crashk_res.start;
+ kbuf.buf_max = crashk_res.end + 1;
+ } else {
+ kbuf.buf_min = 0;
+ kbuf.buf_max = ULONG_MAX;
+ }
+ kbuf.top_down = 0;
+
+ /* Load PT_LOAD segments. */
+ for (i = 0, first_segment = 1; i < ehdr->e_phnum; i++) {
+ phdr = &elf_info->proghdrs[i];
+ if (phdr->p_type != PT_LOAD)
+ continue;
+
+ kbuf.buffer = (void *) elf_info->buffer + phdr->p_offset;
+ kbuf.bufsz = min(phdr->p_filesz, phdr->p_memsz);
+ kbuf.memsz = phdr->p_memsz;
+ kbuf.buf_align = phdr->p_align;
+
+ if (first_segment) {
+ /*
+ * Identify TEXT_OFFSET:
+ * When CONFIG_ARM64_RANDOMIZE_TEXT_OFFSET=y the image
+ * header could be offset in the elf segment. The linker
+ * script sets ehdr->e_entry to the start of text.
+ *
+ * NOTE: In v3.16 or older, h->text_offset is 0,
+ * so use the default, 0x80000
+ */
+ rand_offset = ehdr->e_entry - phdr->p_vaddr;
+ h = (struct arm64_image_header *)
+ (elf_info->buffer + phdr->p_offset +
+ rand_offset);
+
+ if (!arm64_header_check_magic(h))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (h->image_size)
+ text_offset = le64_to_cpu(h->text_offset);
+ else
+ text_offset = 0x80000;
+
+ /* Adjust kernel segment with TEXT_OFFSET */
+ kbuf.memsz += text_offset - rand_offset;
+
+ ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ image->segment[image->nr_segments - 1].mem
+ += text_offset - rand_offset;
+ image->segment[image->nr_segments - 1].memsz
+ -= text_offset - rand_offset;
+
+ *kernel_load_addr = kbuf.mem + text_offset;
+
+ /* for succeeding segmemts */
+ page_offset = ALIGN_DOWN(phdr->p_vaddr, SZ_2M);
+ phys_offset = kbuf.mem;
+
+ first_segment = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Calculate physical address */
+ kbuf.mem = phdr->p_vaddr - page_offset + phys_offset;
+
+ ret = kexec_add_segment(&kbuf);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
+ unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
+ unsigned long initrd_len, char *cmdline,
+ unsigned long cmdline_len)
+{
+ struct elfhdr ehdr;
+ struct elf_info elf_info;
+ unsigned long kernel_load_addr;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Create elf core header segment */
+ ret = load_crashdump_segments(image);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Load the kernel */
+ ret = build_elf_exec_info(kernel_buf, kernel_len, &ehdr, &elf_info);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = elf_exec_load(image, &ehdr, &elf_info, &kernel_load_addr);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ pr_debug("Loaded the kernel at 0x%lx\n", kernel_load_addr);
+
+ /* Load additional data */
+ ret = load_other_segments(image, kernel_load_addr,
+ initrd, initrd_len, cmdline, cmdline_len);
+
+out:
+ elf_free_info(&elf_info);
+
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+/*
+ * The file format is the exact same as module signing:
+ * <kernel> := <Image> + <signature part> + <marker>
+ * <signature part> := <signature data> + <struct module_signature>
+ */
+static int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
+{
+ const size_t marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
+ const struct module_signature *sig;
+ size_t file_len = kernel_len;
+ size_t sig_len;
+ const void *p;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (kernel_len <= marker_len + sizeof(*sig))
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ /* Check for marker */
+ p = kernel + kernel_len - marker_len;
+ if (memcmp(p, MODULE_SIG_STRING, marker_len)) {
+ pr_err("probably the kernel is not signed.\n");
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
+ /* Validate signature */
+ sig = (const struct module_signature *) (p - sizeof(*sig));
+ file_len -= marker_len;
+
+ rc = validate_module_sig(sig, kernel_len - marker_len);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("signature is not valid\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify kernel with signature */
+ sig_len = be32_to_cpu(sig->sig_len);
+ p -= sig_len + sizeof(*sig);
+ file_len -= sig_len + sizeof(*sig);
+
+ rc = verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, p - (void *)kernel, p, sig_len,
+ NULL, VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+ NULL, NULL);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+#endif
+
+struct kexec_file_ops kexec_elf64_ops = {
+ .probe = elf64_probe,
+ .load = elf64_load,
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+ .verify_sig = elf64_verify_sig,
+#endif
+};
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index ab3b19d51727..cb1f24d98f87 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ static struct kexec_file_ops *kexec_file_loaders[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE_IMAGE_FMT
&kexec_image_ops,
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE_ELF_FMT
+ &kexec_elf64_ops,
+#endif
};
int arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
--
2.14.1
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