[RFC 0/3] extend kexec_file_load system call

Vivek Goyal vgoyal at redhat.com
Wed Jul 20 05:46:49 PDT 2016

On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 09:35:30AM +0100, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 01:45:42PM +1000, Balbir Singh wrote:
> > > IOW, if your kernel forced signature verification, you should not be
> > > able to do sig_enforce=0. If you kernel did not have
> > > CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE=y, then sig_enforce should be 0 by default anyway
> > > and you are not making it worse using command line.
> > 
> > OK.. I checked and you are right, but that is an example and there are
> > other things like security=, thermal.*, nosmep, nosmap that need auditing
> > for safety and might hurt the system security if used. I still think
> > think that assuming you can pass any command line without breaking security
> > is a broken argument.
> Quite, and you don't need to run code in a privileged environment to do
> any of that.
> It's also not trivial to protect against: new kernels gain new arguments
> which older kernels may not know about.  No matter how much protection
> is built into older kernels, newer kernels can become vulnerable through
> the addition of further arguments.

If a new kernel command line option becomes an issue, new kernel can
block that in secureboot environment. That way it helps kexec
boot as well as regular boot.


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