[PATCH v3 11/22] ima: define a new hook to measure and appraise a file already in memory
Dmitry Kasatkin
dmitry.kasatkin at gmail.com
Wed Feb 10 12:27:36 PST 2016
On Wed, Feb 3, 2016 at 9:06 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> This patch defines a new IMA hook ima_post_read_file() for measuring
> and appraising files read by the kernel. The caller loads the file into
> memory before calling this function, which calculates the hash followed by
> the normal IMA policy based processing.
>
> Changelog v3:
> - rename ima_hash_and_process_file() to ima_post_read_file()
>
> v1:
> - To simplify patch review, separate the IMA changes from the kexec
> and initramfs changes in "ima: measure and appraise kexec image and
> initramfs" patch. This patch contains just the IMA changes. The
> kexec and initramfs changes are with the rest of the kexec changes
> in "kexec: replace call to copy_file_from_fd() with kernel version".
>
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin at huawei.com>
> ---
> include/linux/ima.h | 8 +++++++
> include/linux/security.h | 1 +
> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 +++-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 6 +++--
> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 1 +
> security/integrity/integrity.h | 7 ++++--
> security/security.c | 7 +++++-
> 9 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
> index 120ccc5..d29a6a2 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ima.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
> @@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
> extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
> extern int ima_module_check(struct file *file);
> extern int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
> +extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> + enum kernel_read_file_id id);
>
> #else
> static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> @@ -52,6 +54,12 @@ static inline int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> + enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index b68ce94..d920718 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
>
> #include <linux/key.h>
> #include <linux/capability.h>
> +#include <linux/fs.h>
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> #include <linux/err.h>
> #include <linux/string.h>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index 2c5262f..0b7134c 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
>
> #include <linux/types.h>
> #include <linux/crypto.h>
> +#include <linux/fs.h>
> #include <linux/security.h>
> #include <linux/hash.h>
> #include <linux/tpm.h>
> @@ -152,7 +153,8 @@ enum ima_hooks {
> int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
> int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
> int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> - struct file *file, enum hash_algo algo);
> + struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> + enum hash_algo algo);
> void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
> const unsigned char *filename,
> struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> index 8750254..370e42d 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> @@ -188,7 +188,8 @@ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
> * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
> */
> int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> - struct file *file, enum hash_algo algo)
> + struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> + enum hash_algo algo)
> {
> const char *audit_cause = "failed";
> struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
> @@ -210,7 +211,8 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>
> hash.hdr.algo = algo;
>
> - result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
> + result = (!buf) ? ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr) :
> + ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr);
> if (!result) {
> int length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length;
> void *tmpbuf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, length,
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index 2888449..cb0d0ff 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
> if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG)
> return;
>
> - rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, ima_hash_algo);
> + rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo);
> if (rc < 0)
> return;
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 78a80c8..bead94b 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -153,8 +153,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
> ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
> }
>
> -static int process_measurement(struct file *file, int mask,
> - enum ima_hooks func, int opened)
> +static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> + int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int opened)
> {
> struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
> struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
> @@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, int mask,
>
> hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
>
> - rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, hash_algo);
> + rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo);
> if (rc != 0) {
> if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
> rc = (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) ? 0 : -EACCES;
> @@ -273,7 +273,8 @@ out:
> int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
> {
> if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC))
> - return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, 0);
> + return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC,
> + MMAP_CHECK, 0);
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -292,7 +293,8 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
> */
> int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> {
> - return process_measurement(bprm->file, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, 0);
> + return process_measurement(bprm->file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC,
> + BPRM_CHECK, 0);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -307,7 +309,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> */
> int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened)
> {
> - return process_measurement(file,
> + return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0,
> mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
> FILE_CHECK, opened);
> }
> @@ -332,7 +334,7 @@ int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
> #endif
> return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */
> }
> - return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK, 0);
> + return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK, 0);
> }
>
> int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
> @@ -343,7 +345,34 @@ int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
> return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
> return 0;
> }
> - return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, FIRMWARE_CHECK, 0);
> + return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, FIRMWARE_CHECK, 0);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * ima_post_read_file - in memory collect/appraise/audit measurement
> + * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit
> + * @buf: pointer to in memory file contents
> + * @size: size of in memory file contents
> + * @read_id: caller identifier
> + *
> + * Measure/appraise/audit in memory file based on policy. Policy rules
> + * are written in terms of a policy identifier.
> + *
> + * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
> + * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
> + */
> +int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> + enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
> +{
> + enum ima_hooks func = FILE_CHECK;
> +
> + if (!file && (!buf || size == 0)) { /* should never happen */
> + if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
> + return -EACCES;
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + return process_measurement(file, buf, size, MAY_READ, func, 0);
> }
>
> static int __init init_ima(void)
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index b089ebe..cfbe86f 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
> */
> #include <linux/module.h>
> #include <linux/list.h>
> +#include <linux/fs.h>
> #include <linux/security.h>
> #include <linux/magic.h>
> #include <linux/parser.h>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> index 5efe2ec..9a0ea4c 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> @@ -49,12 +49,14 @@
> #define IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED 0x00008000
> #define IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE 0x00010000
> #define IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED 0x00020000
> +#define IMA_READ_APPRAISE 0x00040000
> +#define IMA_READ_APPRAISED 0x00080000
> #define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \
> IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE | \
> - IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE)
> + IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE)
> #define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \
> IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED | \
> - IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED)
> + IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED | IMA_READ_APPRAISED)
>
> enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
> IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01,
> @@ -111,6 +113,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
> enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
> enum integrity_status ima_module_status:4;
> enum integrity_status ima_firmware_status:4;
> + enum integrity_status ima_read_status:4;
> enum integrity_status evm_status:4;
> struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash;
> };
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 796a261..ad87e8d 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -913,7 +913,12 @@ int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
> int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> + return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id);
> }
>
> int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
> --
> 2.1.0
>
--
Thanks,
Dmitry
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