kexec_load(2) bypasses signature verification

Dave Young dyoung at
Wed Jun 17 18:25:36 PDT 2015

On 06/15/15 at 04:01pm, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 15, 2015 at 09:37:05AM -0400, Josh Boyer wrote:
> > The bits that actually read Secure Boot state out of the UEFI
> > variables, and apply protections to the machine to avoid compromise
> > under the SB threat model.  Things like disabling the old kexec...
> I don't have any real interest in using Secure Boot, but I *am*
> interested in using CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG[1].  So perhaps we need to
> have something similar to what we have with signed modules in terms of
> CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE and module/sig_enforce, but for
> KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG.  This would mean creating a separate flag
> independent of the one Linus suggested for Secure Boot, but since we
> have one for signed modules, we do have precedent for this sort of
> thing.

Agree and vote for this way as I replied in another email about


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