Kdump with signed images
zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com
Thu Oct 25 02:10:01 EDT 2012
On Wed, 2012-10-24 at 13:36 -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 09:19:27AM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> > Vivek Goyal <vgoyal at redhat.com> writes:
> > > On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 09:18:54AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > >
> > > [..]
> > >> > >> There are 3 options for trusting /sbin/kexec. There are IMA and EMA,
> > >> > >> and it is conceivable to have ELF note sections with signatures for
> > >> > >> executables.
> > >> > >
> > >> > > Can you please tell more about what is EMA and IMA. I did quick google
> > >> > > and could not find much.
> > >> >
> > >> > That should have been EVM and IMA. Look under security/integrity/. I
> > >> > don't know much about them but they appear to be security modules with a
> > >> > focus on verifying checksum or perhaps encrypted hashes of executables
> > >> > are consistent.
> > >>
> > >> I will do some quick search there and I see if I can understand something.
> > >>
> > >
> > > Ok, I quickly went through following paper.
> > >
> > > http://mirror.transact.net.au/sourceforge/l/project/li/linux-ima/linux-ima/Integrity_overview.pdf
> > >
> > > So it looks like that IMA can store the hashes of files and at execute
> > > time ensure those hashes are unchanged to protect against the possibility
> > > of modification of files.
IMA-appraisal originally was hashed based, but Dmitry Kasatkin added
digital signature support. Both have been upstreamed.
> > > But what about creation of a new program which can call kexec_load()
> > > and execute an unsigned kernel. Doesn't look like that will be
> > > prevented using IMA.
Assuming the IMA policy syntax is updated to require 'security.ima' to
contain a digital signature, then it is only a question of protecting
the _ima and _evm keyrings. (Dmitry has such a patch waiting to be
reviewed.) So the new program would have to be vetted by someone
> > > Whole idea behind UEFI secure boot seems to be that all signing happens
> > > outside the running system and now only signed code can run with higher
> > > priviliges.
> > No. UEFI secure boot has absolutely nothing todo with this.
> > UEFI secure boot is about not being able to hijack the code EFI runs
> > directly. Full stop.
> > Some people would like to implment a security policy that says
> > you can't boot an untrusted version of windows from linux if you have
> > booted with UEFI secure boot, so they don't get their bootloader
> > signatures revoked by microsoft.
> > A security model relying on Microsoft's key is totally uniteresting to
> > me. Either signing at the UEFI level is of no use or Microsofts key
> > will fall again to the combined assult of every cracker and every
> > governmental dirty cyber ops division attacking it. Not to mention that
> > Microsoft has little incentive to keep linux booting.
> > I think it is reasonable to be able to support a policy where we can't
> > boot unsigned versions of Microsoft windows. However beyond being able
> > to exclude booting windows being one criteria for our policy mechanism
> > please don't even start to justify things with that ridiculous security
> > policy even indirectly.
> > > IMA seems to be only protecting against only making sure
> > > existing binaries are not modifed but it does not seem to prevent against
> > > installation of new binaries and these binaries take advantage of kexec
> > > system call to load an unsigned kernel.
The IMA/IMA-appraisal policy dictates what needs to be appraised. The
default ima-appraisal policy appraises all files owned by root.
> > I believe you can combine IMA with EVM signed security attributes where
> > the EVM signing key is offline, and the verification key is in the
> > kernel.
> > The combination of IMA and EVM gets very close to being able to sign
> > executables offline and be able to update them.
> [ Again CCing lkml and IMA/EVM folks ]
> After little reading, my understanding is EVM also does not support
> offline signing.
> Given the fact EVM protects IMA data (security.ima), which is generated
> inline, I am not sure how EVM can sign images offline.
> I might have misunderstood things, please correct me if that's not the
IMA-appraisal verifies the integrity of file data, while EVM verifies
the integrity of the file metadata, such as LSM and IMA-appraisal
labels. Both 'security.ima' and 'security.evm' can contain digital
More information about the kexec