[PATCH v2 0/8] makedumpfile: makedumpfile enhancement to filter out kernel data from vmcore
Mahesh J Salgaonkar
mahesh at linux.vnet.ibm.com
Fri May 27 02:56:21 EDT 2011
On 2011-05-26 09:39:23 Thu, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> On Thu, May 26, 2011 at 01:15:14PM +0200, Reinhard Buendgen wrote:
> > Vivek,
> >
> > I/O is not restricted to disk I/O (it may be network I/O, data sent to
> > crtypto cards etc.) and it is not always direct, Device drivers may have
> > buffers to which such data is copied.
> >
> > So it is more than just keys, and it may change over time.
> > I do not think hardwiring a filter in makedumpfile is a good idea because
> > you would need a new makedumpfile release for every Distribution
> > (release).
>
> Ok, so we are worried about data being in slub/slab caches or driver's
> kmalloced buffers etc.
>
> When do I need access to debuginfo files. I am assuming that makedumpfile
> reads them in first kernel sometime and stores relevant info in initramfs.
> Otherwise, it is not possible to get to it in second kernel after crash.
>
The current approach is to re-run the makedumpfile on the crash dump
(generated in the second kernel) when we are back into production kernel
(1st kernel).
> >
> > Allowing to configure makedumpfile allows each distribution and each
> > platform to provide appropriate filters.
> >
>
> I was thinking that there are very few symbols and these will not change
> frequently. makdumpfile is already dependent on some kenrel data strcutres
> and symbols for doing filtering.
>
> But looks like you are planning to filter out lots of symbols. So in that
> case agreed that hardcoding is not a good idea.
>
> Thanks
> Vivek
>
> > Mit freundlichen Grüßen/Best Regards/Cordialement
> >
> > Reinhard
> >
> > Dr. Reinhard Bündgen
> > RAS & Crypto Architect for Linux on System z
> > Virtualization and Systems Management
> >
> > Mail:buendgen at de.ibm.com
> > Phone: ++49-(0)7031-16-1130
> > Fax: ++49-(0)7031-16-3456
> >
> > IBM Deutschland Research & Development GmbH
> > Vorsitzender des Aufsichtsrats: Martin Jetter
> > Geschäftsführung: Dirk Wittkopp
> > Sitz der Gesellschaft: Böblingen
> > Registergericht: Amtsgericht Stuttgart, HRB 243294
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal at redhat.com>
> > To: Reinhard Buendgen/Germany/IBM at IBMDE
> > Cc: Dave Anderson <anderson at redhat.com>, Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli
> > <ananth at in.ibm.com>, kexec at lists.infradead.org, Mahesh J Salgaonkar
> > <mahesh at linux.vnet.ibm.com>, "Ken'ichi Ohmichi"
> > <oomichi at mxs.nes.nec.co.jp>, V Srivatsa <vsrivatsa at in.ibm.com>
> > Date: 25.05.2011 21:53
> > Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/8] makedumpfile: makedumpfile enhancement
> > to filter out kernel data from vmcore
> >
> >
> >
> > On Wed, May 25, 2011 at 10:41:55AM +0200, Reinhard Buendgen wrote:
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > to answer Vivek questions first: Eventually we want to be able to erase
> > > all data that a customer may consider sensitive to her privacy. In
> > > addition to encryption key that may be the contents (i.e. payload
> > within)
> > > of all kinds of I/O buffers. Consider you are running a kvm based
> > > hypervisor and want its dump to be analyized while promising your
> > > customers whose guests you run on that hypervisor that none of their
> > data
> > > will be externalized. Or consider your system reads a spreadsheat with
> > > bank account or health information. You might not want to send fractions
> >
> > > of that information sitting in some buffers to a service organization.
> >
> > So for direct IO, buffer is still in user space and should be filtered
> > out when we filter out user space pages using mkdumpfile. For kvm, I am
> > assuming that all the pages belong to qemu process and once we are
> > filtering out user space pages, any data belonging to guest will go away.
> >
> > So atleast for above examples it does not sound as if we need symbol
> > erase infrastructure.
> >
> > >
> > > to answer Daves concern: there is no intention that crash should ever
> > look
> > > into the erased structures. In theroy it should not be needed because
> > the
> > > contents of structures to be deleted should be irrelevant to kernel
> > > debugging.
> >
> > So what are those kernel structures which we are planning to delete and
> > are irrelevant to kernel debugging by crash?
> >
> > I think we are missing something here. If there are only few known
> > structures we want to get rid of, lets hardcode it in makedumpfile
> > instead of giving user a generic infrastructure. That way we know
> > that we are not leaking information at the same time making sure
> > that analysis tools are working.
> >
> > Thanks
> > Vivek
> >
>
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Mahesh J Salgaonkar
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