[PATCH v3 46/46] PR: Skip key installation for EDCA-based ranging

[Kavita Kavita]

IEEE 802.11az-2022 section 11.21.6.3 defines a secure FTM session
as one where a PTKSA is established and Protected FTM frames are
exchanged. This applies to TB ranging, non-TB ranging, and EDCA-based
ranging only when the Format And Bandwidth field (Table 9-280)
indicates DMG or EDMG format. For EDCA-based ranging, no encryption
mechanism is defined for FTM timestamp frames and the spec explicitly
states that an ISTA shall not set up a secure FTM session in this case.

Skip key installation for EDCA-based ranging since there is no point
in installing keys to the firmware when they will never be used.

Signed-off-by: Kavita Kavita <kavita.kavita at oss.qualcomm.com>
---
 src/common/proximity_ranging.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/common/proximity_ranging.c b/src/common/proximity_ranging.c
index 57e3f7b44..3b154d1b6 100644
--- a/src/common/proximity_ranging.c
+++ b/src/common/proximity_ranging.c
@@ -2484,7 +2484,8 @@ static int pr_pasn_handle_auth_1(struct pr_data *pr, struct pr_device *dev,
 		goto fail;
 	}
 
-	if (pr->cfg->set_keys)
+	if (!(dev->protocol_type & PR_EDCA_BASED_RANGING) &&
+	    pr->cfg->set_keys)
 		pr->cfg->set_keys(pr->cfg->cb_ctx, pr->cfg->dev_addr,
 				  dev->pr_device_addr, dev->pasn->cipher,
 				  dev->pasn->akmp, &dev->pasn->ptk);
@@ -2533,7 +2534,8 @@ static int pr_pasn_handle_auth_2(struct pr_data *pr, struct pr_device *dev,
 		goto fail;
 	}
 
-	if (pr->cfg->set_keys)
+	if (!(dev->protocol_type & PR_EDCA_BASED_RANGING) &&
+	    pr->cfg->set_keys)
 		pr->cfg->set_keys(pr->cfg->cb_ctx, pr->cfg->dev_addr,
 				  dev->pr_device_addr, dev->pasn->cipher,
 				  dev->pasn->akmp, &dev->pasn->ptk);
-- 
2.34.1