Possible security hole when attacker connects with wrong WPA/RSN IE
Tue Nov 3 10:01:27 PST 2009
Sorry, but in prev. patch *_STATUS_* should be changed to *_REASON_*.
Fixed patch attached.
On 2009-11-03 19:53, Andriy Tkachuk wrote:
> Hello Jouni and folks.
> It looks like hostapd allows (for example, when working with madwifi,
> atheros or bsd driver wrappers) for clients to stay connected
> infinitely when they connected with wrong WPA/RSN IE, while Host AP
> driver will fail association for such clients. In worse case, when
> vendors don't implement EAPoL frames filtering before 4-way handshake
> completes and keys are set, an attacker may stay connected and use AP
> resources in Open mode. In less worse case the AP could be open for
> DoS attack.
> The solution seems to be straightforward - just disconnect such
> clients either from driver wrappers, or maybe even better - from
> hostapd_notif_assoc() routine, for example, like in attached patch.
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