[PATCH v2 2/5] hardening: support zeroing all malloc buffers by default

[Ahmad Fatoum]

dummy malloc doesn't free and all allocations are in freshly sbrk()'d
memory, which already zero.

Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum at pengutronix.de>
---
 common/calloc.c       |  7 +++----
 common/dlmalloc.c     |  7 +++++++
 common/tlsf.c         |  6 ++++++
 include/malloc.h      | 10 ++++++++++
 lib/Kconfig.hardening | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/common/calloc.c b/common/calloc.c
index 12f18474a4c8..17cbd9beefee 100644
--- a/common/calloc.c
+++ b/common/calloc.c
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 #include <common.h>
 #include <malloc.h>
+#include <memory.h>
 #include <linux/overflow.h>
 
 /*
@@ -12,10 +13,8 @@ void *calloc(size_t n, size_t elem_size)
 	size_t size = size_mul(elem_size, n);
 	void *r = malloc(size);
 
-	if (!r)
-		return r;
-
-	memset(r, 0x0, size);
+	if (r && !want_init_on_alloc())
+		memset(r, 0x0, size);
 
 	return r;
 }
diff --git a/common/dlmalloc.c b/common/dlmalloc.c
index 821a193af6bc..731c46b584b0 100644
--- a/common/dlmalloc.c
+++ b/common/dlmalloc.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 #include <dlmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/overflow.h>
 #include <linux/build_bug.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <module.h>
@@ -1368,6 +1369,8 @@ void dlfree(void *mem)
 	p = mem2chunk(mem);
 	hd = p->size;
 
+	if (want_init_on_free())
+		memzero_explicit(mem, chunksize(p));
 
 	sz = hd & ~PREV_INUSE;
 	next = chunk_at_offset(p, sz);
@@ -1952,7 +1955,11 @@ void malloc_stats(void)
 */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MALLOC_DLMALLOC
+#ifdef CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON
+void *malloc(size_t bytes) { return dlcalloc(1, bytes); }
+#else
 void *malloc(size_t) __alias(dlmalloc);
+#endif
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(malloc);
 void *calloc(size_t, size_t) __alias(dlcalloc);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(calloc);
diff --git a/common/tlsf.c b/common/tlsf.c
index ba2ed367c0b9..4cd90e150de2 100644
--- a/common/tlsf.c
+++ b/common/tlsf.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <malloc.h>
 #include <tlsf.h>
 #include "tlsfbits.h"
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
@@ -615,6 +616,9 @@ static void* block_prepare_used(control_t* control, block_header_t* block,
 		kasan_poison_shadow(&block->size, size + 2 * sizeof(size_t),
 			    KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 		kasan_unpoison_shadow(p, used);
+
+		if (want_init_on_alloc())
+			memzero_explicit(p, size);
 	}
 	return p;
 }
@@ -1023,6 +1027,8 @@ void tlsf_free(tlsf_t tlsf, void* ptr)
 		control_t* control = tlsf_cast(control_t*, tlsf);
 		block_header_t* block = block_from_ptr(ptr);
 		tlsf_assert(!block_is_free(block) && "block already marked as free");
+		if (want_init_on_free())
+			memzero_explicit(ptr, block_size(block));
 		kasan_poison_shadow(ptr, block_size(block), 0xff);
 		block_mark_as_free(block);
 		block = block_merge_prev(control, block);
diff --git a/include/malloc.h b/include/malloc.h
index a823ce8c8462..7bee03dab236 100644
--- a/include/malloc.h
+++ b/include/malloc.h
@@ -54,4 +54,14 @@ static inline int mem_malloc_is_initialized(void)
 }
 #endif
 
+static inline bool want_init_on_alloc(void)
+{
+	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON);
+}
+
+static inline bool want_init_on_free(void)
+{
+	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON);
+}
+
 #endif /* __MALLOC_H */
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.hardening b/lib/Kconfig.hardening
index 28be42a27465..7a177840a5a1 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -10,6 +10,29 @@ config BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+menu "Memory initialization"
+
+config INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON
+	bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on allocation by default"
+	depends on !MALLOC_LIBC
+	help
+	  When this is enabled, all allocator memory will be zeroed
+	  when allocated, eliminating many kinds of "uninitialized
+	  heap memory" flaws, especially heap content exposures.
+
+config INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON
+	bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on free by default"
+	depends on !MALLOC_DUMMY && !MALLOC_LIBC
+	help
+	  When this is enabled, all allocator memory will be zeroed
+	  when freed, eliminating many kinds of "uninitialized heap memory"
+	  flaws, especially heap content exposures. The primary difference
+	  is that data lifetime in memory is reduced, as anything freed is
+	  wiped immediately, making live forensics or cold boot memory
+	  attacks unable to recover freed memory contents.
+
+endmenu
+
 config STACK_GUARD_PAGE
 	bool "Place guard page to catch stack overflows"
 	depends on ARM && MMU
-- 
2.39.5