[PATCH 06/13] boot_verify: make it modifiable at start time
Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
plagnioj at jcrosoft.com
Sat Mar 25 19:44:57 PDT 2017
Signed-off-by: Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD <plagnioj at jcrosoft.com>
---
commands/bootm.c | 2 +-
common/boot_verify.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
common/bootm.c | 2 +-
include/boot_verify.h | 15 ++++++++++++---
4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/commands/bootm.c b/commands/bootm.c
index b35aaa914..cb520a1ba 100644
--- a/commands/bootm.c
+++ b/commands/bootm.c
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static int do_bootm(int argc, char *argv[])
while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, BOOTM_OPTS)) > 0) {
switch(opt) {
case 'c':
- if (data.verify < BOOT_VERIFY_HASH)
+ if (data.verify > BOOT_VERIFY_HASH)
data.verify = BOOT_VERIFY_HASH;
break;
case 's':
diff --git a/common/boot_verify.c b/common/boot_verify.c
index afe929e68..9cbeb7a65 100644
--- a/common/boot_verify.c
+++ b/common/boot_verify.c
@@ -11,22 +11,49 @@ enum boot_verify boot_get_verify_mode(void)
return boot_verify_mode;
}
+/* keep it for the most secure to the less */
static const char * const boot_verify_names[] = {
-#ifndef CONFIG_BOOT_FORCE_SIGNED_IMAGES
- [BOOT_VERIFY_NONE] = "none",
- [BOOT_VERIFY_HASH] = "hash",
- [BOOT_VERIFY_AVAILABLE] = "available",
-#endif
[BOOT_VERIFY_SIGNATURE] = "signature",
+ [BOOT_VERIFY_AVAILABLE] = "available",
+ [BOOT_VERIFY_HASH] = "hash",
+ [BOOT_VERIFY_NONE] = "none",
};
+/* allow architecture to overwrite it such as EFI */
+static int default_is_secure_mode(void)
+{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BOOT_FORCE_SIGNED_IMAGES))
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int (*__is_secure_mode)(void) = default_is_secure_mode;
+
+int is_secure_mode(void)
+{
+ return __is_secure_mode();
+}
+
+void boot_set_is_secure_mode(int (*fn)(void))
+{
+ __is_secure_mode = fn;
+}
+
static int init_boot_verify(void)
{
+ int size;
+
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BOOT_FORCE_SIGNED_IMAGES))
boot_verify_mode = BOOT_VERIFY_SIGNATURE;
+ if (is_secure_mode())
+ size = 1;
+ else
+ size = ARRAY_SIZE(boot_verify_names);
+
globalvar_add_simple_enum("boot.verify", (unsigned int *)&boot_verify_mode,
- boot_verify_names, ARRAY_SIZE(boot_verify_names));
+ boot_verify_names, size);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/common/bootm.c b/common/bootm.c
index 74202a829..1558f3c5d 100644
--- a/common/bootm.c
+++ b/common/bootm.c
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static int bootm_open_initrd_uimage(struct image_data *data)
if (!data->initrd)
return -EINVAL;
- if (boot_get_verify_mode() > BOOT_VERIFY_NONE) {
+ if (boot_get_verify_mode() != BOOT_VERIFY_NONE) {
ret = uimage_verify(data->initrd);
if (ret) {
printf("Checking data crc failed with %s\n",
diff --git a/include/boot_verify.h b/include/boot_verify.h
index 3a4436584..ee830bf5c 100644
--- a/include/boot_verify.h
+++ b/include/boot_verify.h
@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
#define __BOOT_VERIFY_H__
enum boot_verify {
- BOOT_VERIFY_NONE,
- BOOT_VERIFY_HASH,
- BOOT_VERIFY_AVAILABLE,
BOOT_VERIFY_SIGNATURE,
+ BOOT_VERIFY_AVAILABLE,
+ BOOT_VERIFY_HASH,
+ BOOT_VERIFY_NONE,
};
#ifndef CONFIG_BOOT_VERIFY
@@ -13,8 +13,17 @@ static inline enum boot_verify boot_get_verify_mode(void)
{
return BOOT_VERIFY_NONE;
}
+
+static int inline is_secure_mode(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void inline boot_set_is_secure_mode(int (*fn)(void)) {}
#else
enum boot_verify boot_get_verify_mode(void);
+int is_secure_mode(void);
+void boot_set_is_secure_mode(int (*fn)(void));
#endif
#endif /* __BOOT_VERIFY_H__ */
--
2.11.0
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